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The New Abridged Reporter's Privilege:
Policies, Principles, and
Pathological Perspectives
ERIK UGLAND*
This Article contends that contemporary arguments about the
reporter'sprivilegeare increasinglysituated within a dividedframework in
which protections for confidential and nonconfidential information are
treatedas separate interests that lack a sharedtheoreticaljustification. This
is both a cause and consequence of a broader tendency among judges,
legislators,journalists, and lawyers to emphasize policy-based conceptions
of the privilege that arefocused on case-specific calculations of harms and
benefits, rather than principle-based conceptions focused on journalistic
autonomy and the needfor a structuralseparationofpress andgovernment.
Policy arguments present the privilege as a narrow, utilitariandevice
for elicitingpublic-interest disclosuresfrom sources, not as a fundamental
right tied to the investigative and expressive autonomy of those who gather
and report news. Policy-based conceptions of the privilege are therefore
more vulnerable to uneven applications, more likely to be reserved for
particulartypes ofproceedings, more likely to be balancedaway in theface
of competing social concerns, and more likely to exclude non-traditional
journalists. In addition, policy-based conceptions devalue the journalistic
foundations of the privilege by tying its value to the preservationof sources"
expression while at the same time minimizing the effect of subpoenas on
reporters' expression.
This Article shows that lawyers and legal scholars have also narrowed
their conceptions of the privilege-sometimes unwittingly and sometimes as
part of a deliberate, "'pathological" effort to preserve some core
protections by surrenderingothers. In doing so, they have contributedto the
broader conceptual compression that is evident in the scholarly literature,
public discourse, and debates over proposed state andfederal shield laws,
which increasingly reduce the privilege to merely a protection for
confidential sources and that permit a host of other qualifications and
exceptions.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 2
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: POLICY V. PRINCIPLE ........................ 9

III. JUDICIAL RULINGS AND RATIONALES ......................................... 17

* Assistant Professor, J. William & Mary Diederich College of Communication,
Marquette University. B.A., University of Minnesota; J.D., University of Minnesota;
M.A., University of Minnesota; Ph.D., University of Minnesota.

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:1

A. Shifting Frameworks:A New PathologicalPeriod.............. 20
B. Substantive Context: Confidential v. Nonconfidential......34

C. Legal-ProceduralContext .................................................... 47
54
IV. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES AND EXTRA-JUDICIAL ARGUMENTS .......

A. A FederalShield Law? ........................................................ 55
B. State Shield Laws ................................................................. 57
C. Lawyer Responses: PracticalStrategiesand Pathological
P erspectives .......................................................................... 60
V . CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 69
I. INTRODUCTION

For nearly four decades, journalists have actively sought judicial
recognition of a First Amendment reporter's privilege l that would free their
newsgathering and preserve their independence by shielding them from
certain subpoenas. 2 Those supporting the privilege have traditionally rooted
their arguments in the principle of autonomy and have relied on a
combination of instrumental and fundamental-rights rationales. The
instrumental arguments focus on the free flow of information,3 the utility of
1 Most versions of the privilege give journalists a qualified right to refuse to comply
with subpoenas seeking their testimony or work products absent a showing by the
subpoenaing party that it has a compelling need for information in the journalist's
possession, that the information is relevant to the proceeding, and that it is not available
through alternative channels. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 743 (1972)
(Stewart, J., dissenting). In Branzburg, the Supreme Court refused to recognize a First
Amendment reporter's privilege in the context of a federal grand jury proceeding.
However, Justice Lewis Powell cast the decisive vote in a concurring opinion that sought
to limit the majority ruling to the specific facts presented, leaving open the possibility
that a privilege could be recognized in other contexts. As a result, many lower federal
courts have since recognized some form of the privilege, and many have endorsed the
criteria outlined in Justice Stewart's Branzburg dissent, which suggested that before
journalists are asked to reveal their sources, the government should be required to:
(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has information that is
clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the
information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First
Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the
information. Id.at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
2 Subpoenas can be for testimony (ad testificandum) or work products (duces
tecum), and they can be issued by courts, lawyers (acting as officers of the court) or
legislative bodies.
3
See, e.g., SOC'Y OF PROF. JOURNALISTS, FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION ACT
TALKING POINTS, http://www.spj.org/pdf/freeflowinfo.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2010)
(arguing that "an informed citizenry is crucial to democracy and helps keep our
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confidentiality as a means of gaining access to hidden information,4 and the
risk that sources will be less forthcoming in the absence of a privilege. 5 The
rights-based arguments, meanwhile, suggest that the Constitution compels a
strict separation between press and government, 6 and that without some
evidentiary shield, journalists would be prone to harassment, intimidation,
and other encumbrances on their independent acquisition and dissemination
of news. 7 Although these lines of argument are often conflated by journalists
and their advocates-and even more often by their opponents-they have
been embraced by dozens of courts and legislatures, most of which have
recognized a privilege 8 that may be claimed in a variety of legal contexts 1and
0
9
that typically protects both confidential and nonconfidential information.

government accountable."); Christine Tatum, Federal Shield Would Protect Public's
Right to Know, http://www.spj.org/rrr.asp?ref-58&t-foia (last visited Jan. 19, 2010).
4 See, e.g., Irwin Gratz, The Case for a Federal Shield Law, SPJ NEWS, July 20,
2005, http://www.spj.org/news.asp?ref-512 ("[T]here's little denying reporters sometime
[sic] need to promise confidentiality. Some of the greatest investigative stories of our age
have relied on them.").
5 See, e.g., In re Taylor, 193 A.2d 181, 185 (Pa. 1963) ("We would be unrealistic if
we did not take judicial notice of another matter of wide public knowledge and great
importance, namely, that important information, tips and leads will dry up.. . unless
newsmen are able to fully and completely protect the sources of their information."
(emphasis omitted)).
6 These arguments suggest that the First Amendment, specifically the Press Clause,
requires some division of journalists and government, and that this is an intentional
feature of the Constitutional design. See Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 631, 633-34 (1975) (arguing that the Press Clause is a "structural provision" that
protects the "institutional autonomy of the press.").
7 See, e.g., Branzburg,408 U.S. at 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (warning that
without some protection against subpoenas, prosecutors could "annex the journalistic
profession as an investigative arm of government."); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Why We
Need a FederalReporter's Privilege, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 39, 39 (2005) ("A strong and
").
effective journalist-source privilege is essential to a robust and independent press ....
8 Several federal circuit courts have recognized a qualified privilege. In re Madden,
151 F.3d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 971 (5th Cir.
1998); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 853
(4th Cir. 1992); United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181 n.82 (1st Cir.
1988); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v.
Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (1 1th Cir. 1986). Two circuits have explicitly rejected the
privilege. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Storer Commc'ns, Inc. v. Giovan), 810 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1987)
[hereinafter Storer Commc'ns Proceedings]. Other courts have recognized varying levels
of protection under the First Amendment, state constitutions, state or federal common
law, or state and federal administrative procedures. Thirty-seven states and the District of
Columbia have passed shield laws that provide a statutory privilege. See generally
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More recently, however, there has been a shift of emphasis and a
conspicuous narrowing of some judicial, legislative, and popular conceptions
of the privilege. Beginning in the late 1990s, some courts began to pull back
from what had been a two-and-a-half decade period of reporter's privilege
expansion. The Seventh Circuit catalyzed that shift in 2003 in an
extraordinary opinion written by Judge Richard Posner in which the court not
only refused to recognize a First Amendment or common law reporter's
privilege, but it also castigated those courts that had done so, accusing them
of ignoring or misunderstanding the central tenets of the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1972 ruling in Branzburg v. Hayes."1 Judge Posner seemed
especially disgruntled by those courts that had extended the privilege to
nonconfidential information. Any court that does so, Posner said, is "skating
12
on thin ice."'
This attenuated view in which the privilege is limited to confidential
source protections, if it is acknowledged at all, is now commonly highlighted
13
in public discussions as well. Debate over the proposed federal shield law,
for example, has focused almost entirely on the sanctity of confidential
source relationships and the value of leaks as a tool for preserving
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Privilege Compendium,
http://www.rcfp.org/privilege/index.php (last visited Jan. 19, 2010). And Congress is
considering a federal shield law. See infra note 13.
9 This generally includes both the identities of confidential sources and other
materials that, if made public, could expose the identity of a source.
10 This generally includes reporters' work products (notes, video outtakes), which
reporters generate themselves, or documentary materials (reports, memos), which
journalists acquire from other sources.
11McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
12 Id.at 533.
13 On February 11, 2009, Rep. Rick Boucher and Rep. Mike Pence introduced
H.R. 985, a bill known as the Free Flow of Information Act of 2009, which the House
passed on a voice vote on March 31, 2009. H.R. 985, 111th Cong. (2009). It is
substantively the same bill that the House passed overwhelmingly in 2007. H.R. 2102,
110th Cong. (2007); 156 Cong. Rec. 4209 (2009). The Senate's 2007 version of that bill,
S. 1267, 110th Cong. (2007), was never brought to the floor for a vote. On February 13,
2009, Sen. Arlen Specter reintroduced the Senate bill as S.448, 11 1th Cong. (2009). As
of this writing, the Senate Judiciary Committee has approved the bill but the full Senate
has yet to vote on it. The two bills presented in the 111th Congress are very similar in
that they provide qualified protection for reporters to conceal their confidential
information. H.R. 985, 11 1th Cong. (2009); S.448, 11 1th Cong. (2009). The House bill
goes further, however, by protecting nonconfidential information, whereas the Senate bill
explicitly excludes protection for nonconfidential information. H.R. 985, 111 th Cong. § 2
(2009). However, the House bill's definition of journalist is much narrower than the one
in the Senate bill, and only protects those who practice journalism for a "substantial
portion of the person's livelihood or for substantial financial gain." Id.
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government accountability. In addition, congressional testimony, 14
newspaper editorials, 15 and other public communications 16 are almost
completely devoid of arguments related to nonconfidential information or the
broader autonomy principles that undergird the privilege, yet all highlight the
need to maintain an expressive channel for whistleblowers and other
anonymous speakers. 17
All of this rhetorical framing encourages a one-dimensional view of the
privilege that is oriented around source confidentiality even though 97% of
journalist subpoenas are for nonconfidential information. 18 More importantly,
by focusing on confidentiality and employing instrumental arguments-that
allowing reporters to protect their sources will yield some immediate and
demonstrable social benefit-proponents of the privilege pull it from its
theoretical moorings and essentially recast it as a negotiable policy
preference rather than an a priori principle. This enables courts and
legislatures to selectively apply the protection. It also neglects the fact that
the protections for confidential and nonconfidential information are both

14 Nearly all of the June 14, 2007, hearing before the House Judiciary Committee
dealt with the issue of confidentiality and the impact of a shield on reporters' source
relationships. Free Flow of Information Act of 2007: Hearingon H.R. 2102 Before the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 105-06 (2007) (letter from Dennis A. Cardman,
Acting Director of American Bar Association). No attention was focused on
nonconfidential information, even though the House bill would protect nonconfidential
information. Reporters' Privilege Legislation: Preserving Effective Federal Law
Enforcement: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2-8 (2006)
(statement of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen.).
15 Of the hundreds of editorials written between 2005 and 2008 about the various
versions of the Free Flow of Information Act, nearly all characterize it, as the New York
Times did, as a measure that would "give reporters limited protection against being
compelled to reveal confidential sources in federal court." Editorial, Protecting a Basic
Freedom, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 21, 2008, at A20. This is not an inaccurate description, but
it's incomplete, because it reduces the privilege to solely a protection for confidential
sources.
16 See, e.g., SOC'Y OF PROF. JOURNALISTS, supra note 3 ("Compelling reporters
to... reveal the identity of a confidential source, will restrict the flow of information to
the public.").
17 This is surprising because the House and Senate bills are split on this point, with
the House bill protecting nonconfidential information and the Senate bill protecting only
confidential information. See supra note 13.
18 RonNell Andersen Jones, Avalanche or Undue Alarm: An Empirical Study of
Subpoenas Received by the News Media, 93 MINN. L. REv. 585, 626, 643 (2008)
(indicating that newspapers and broadcast stations received an estimated 7244 subpoenas
in 2006, only 213 of which were for confidential information).
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products of the same Fourth Estate philosophy, 19 and that any attempt to
jettison one in order to save the other ultimately damages both.
Nevertheless, some news organizations and their lawyers are being
forced to make a pragmatic choice to accept a truncated version of the
privilege that is limited to source protection-or that is saddled with other
qualifications and exceptions-or risk losing the protection altogether. Some
of the journalists lobbying for shield-law protection, for example, have
concluded that they should "take what [they] can get."'20 And Eve Burton,
general counsel for the Hearst Corporation, says the shifting attitudes among
judges, particularly in the federal courts, have led lawyers to be more
cautious in their responses to subpoenas. 2 1 Indeed, an exhaustive 2006 survey
of daily newspapers and broadcast news organizations revealed that those
22
organizations complied fully with 60% of all subpoenas issued that year,
and that even in states with shield laws they complied fully, with no
23
opposition more than half the time.
These tactical responses could be manifestations of what Vincent Blasi
calls the "pathological perspective" of the First Amendment, 24 which
suggests that the impulse to suppress speech is a kind of social pathology that
metastasizes during times of crises. 25 It is prudent, therefore, to surrender

19 Edmund Burke first used this phrase to refer to the press gallery in the House of
Commons. Today is it used not only as a general reference to the press but also as a way
of characterizing the press' societal role, which is to serve as an institution outside of
government that monitors and exposes the abuses of powerful interests. See generally
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION (1991). This is also
referred to as the watchdog function of the press. See, e.g., TIMOTHY W. GLEASON, THE
WATCHDOG CONCEPT: THE PRESS AND THE COURTS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA,

4-5 (1990).
20 David Westphal, Secrets and Subpoenas, AM. EDITOR, Mar. 2007, at 4 (quoting
San FranciscoChroniclereporter Lance Williams).
21 Telephone Interview with Eve Burton, Vice President and General Counsel,
Hearst Corp. (June 18, 2009).
22 Jones, supra note 18, at 661.
23 Id. at 662. The compliance rate in states without shield laws was 73.9% and
54.4% in states with shield laws. Id. The author notes, however, that some news
organizations, especially broadcasters, did occasionally negotiate with the subpoenaing
party to narrow the scope of the request. Id. at 664-65.
24 Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 449 (1985).
25
Id.at 450; see also FREDRICK S. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND,
1476-1776: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL 10 (1952) ("The area of
freedom contracts and the enforcement of restraints increases as the stresses on the
stability of the government and the structure of society increase.").
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some peripheral protections to ensure that the most "serious, time-honored" 26
freedoms remain intact during "pathological" periods. 27 Although lawyers
cannot be expected to try to reshape the law when their overriding
obligations are to serve their clients' interests, a collateral consequence of
these responses could be to entrench or exacerbate a judicial pull-back. They
could also add to the conceptual compression that is apparent in public
discourse 28 and some scholarly work 29 in which the privilege is reduced to
solely a protection for confidential sources or is otherwise laden with
exceptions.
All of these issues are of special concern because journalists are
increasingly being targeted to reveal the products of their newsgathering
efforts; 30 many courts are refusing to recognize those protections or are
feebly enforcing them; 3 1 some judges are imposing exceedingly harsh
26

Blasi, supra note 24, at 477.

27 Id. at 450 ("'Pathology' in the sense I use the term is a social phenomenon,
characterized by a notable shift in attitudes regarding the tolerance of unorthodox
ideas."). This is arguably a pathological period in that federal prosecutors have shown
little restraint in subpoenaing journalists, and several journalists have been sent to jail by
federal judges for refusing to divulge their confidential sources. See REPORTERS COMM.

FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, SHIELDS AND SUBPOENAS: THE REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE IN
FEDERAL COURTS (2009) [hereinafter SHIELDS AND SUBPOENAS], http://www.rcfp.org/

shields and subpoenas.html.
28 See infra Part IV.D.

29 See, e.g., Laurence B. Alexander, Looking out for the Watchdogs: A Legislative
ProposalLimiting the Newsgathering Privilege to Journalists in the Greatest Need of
Protection for Sources and Information, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 97, 101 (2002)
(arguing that a privilege should be reserved for journalists and not necessarily all people
who serve journalistic functions); Christopher J. Clark, The Recognition of a Qualified
Privilege for Non-Confidential Journalistic Materials: Good Intentions, Bad Law, 65
BROOK. L. REV. 369, 379 (1999); Randall D. Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers, and Fourth
Estate Inmates: The Misguided Pursuitof a Reporter's Privilege, 24 CARDOzO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 385, 386 (2006) (rejecting the assumption that in the absence of a privilege,
sources will be reluctant to speak to the press); see also infra Part IV.D.
30 See Jones, supra note 18, at 638. One recent high-profile case that illustrates the
problem involves Cook County (Ill.) State's Attorney Anita Alvarez and several student
participants in the Innocence Project at Northwestern University. After the students
produced a report claiming an alleged murderer had been wrongly convicted in 1978,
Alvarez subpoenaed the students' notes, tapes, and transcripts, as well as their course
syllabi, grades and other academic records, which Boston University Professor T. Barton
Carter characterized as "one of the great fishing expeditions of all time." Dan Fletcher,
Medill Case: Are Student Journalists Protected?, TIME.COM, Oct. 22, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1931682,00.html.
31 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 972-73 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (refusing to recognize a federal common law privilege) [hereinafter Judith
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contempt penalties on noncompliant journalists;32 the circuit courts are split
in terms of both theory and doctrine; 33 and Congress and several state
legislatures are actively debating the need for statutory protections. 34 And all
of this is occurring at a time when technological shifts and professional
trends are forcing the country to reexamine the core purposes of the First
Amendment, the relationship between journalists and government, and the
35
meaning of "the press."
This Article suggests that contemporary arguments about the reporter's
privilege are increasingly situated within a bifurcated framework in which
protections for confidential and nonconfidential information are treated as
separate interests that lack a shared theoretical justification. This is both a
cause and consequence of the more general tendency among all parties to
employ policy-based conceptions of the privilege in which the balancing of
interests is focused on the most immediate and demonstrable consequences,
rather than principle-based conceptions that take account of the importance
of press autonomy and the role of the press in the broader social-democratic
architecture. Policy-based conceptions of the privilege are more vulnerable to
ad hoc manipulations, more likely to be reserved for particular types of
proceedings, more likely to be balanced away in the face of competing social
concerns, and more susceptible to cramped applications that exclude nontraditional journalists. These conceptions also devalue the newsgathering
dimensions of the privilege by fixing its value to the preservation of sources'
expression, while at the same time minimizing the effect of subpoenas on

Miller Subpoena]; McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003) (refusing to
recognize First Amendment reporter's privilege).
32 Federal Judge Reggie Walton, for example, held USA Today reporter Toni Locy
in contempt after she refused to comply with a confidential-source subpoena in the
*Privacy Act case filed by former Army scientist Stephen Hatfill. See infra notes 135-36
and accompanying text. Walton ordered Locy to pay $500 per day for the first seven days
she refused to comply, $1000 per day for the next seven days, and $5000 a day for the
next seven, after which Walton said he would reassess the dispute. He also prohibited
Locy from receiving assistance from anyone, including her employer, thus raising the
specter of a reporter being forced to choose between personal bankruptcy and the
protection of her sources. See generally SHIELDS AND SUBPOENAS, supra note 27.
33 See infra Part III.
34 See supra note 13, describing the federal shield bills. See also infra Part IV.A-B,
describing the activity in Congress and the state legislatures.
35 Courts and legislatures are substantially divided on the extent to which the
privilege should protect bloggers, freelancers, and other non-traditional journalists, and it
is a key point of separation between the two federal shield bills currently before
Congress, with the House bill favoring a narrow definition focused on traditional
practitioners and the Senate bill using a broader definition that would clearly encompass

most serious bloggers. See supra note 13.
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reporters' expression. To the extent that journalists and their advocates are
embracing this divided model as a strategic response to legislative or judicial
activity, they not only misperceive the extent of the legal retreat, they make it
more likely by undercutting some of the central arguments that support the
privilege.
Part II of this Article describes two key interpretive tracks that pervade
the judicial, legislative, scholarly, and public treatments of the reporter's
privilege (a policy model that relies on instrumental arguments and a
principle model supported by autonomy/fundamental-rights arguments) and
the theoretical and doctrinal implications of each. Part IH shows more
concretely how the courts have characterized the privilege, which
interpretive models they have favored, and how those choices have affected
the judicial transition from a period of reporter's-privilege expansion
(roughly from Branzburg through the late 1990s) to the current
"pathological" period in which the scope and strength of the privilege are
contracting. Part IV looks at how legislatures and media lawyers have
responded to these shifts, and at how scholars, journalists, and others have
framed the privilege issue in their writings and public discourse. Part V
concludes by highlighting the Article's central contentions and providing
some recommendations for journalists, lawyers, judges, and policymakers.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: POLICY V. PRINCIPLE
The theoretical foundations of the reporter's privilege are hard to isolate
because there are so many different expressions of the privilege and so many
legal mechanisms by which it is secured. Courts have recognized the
privilege as a First Amendment principle, 36 as an aspect of state
constitutional law, 37 and as a procedural rule under federal3 8 and state 39
common law. In addition, thirty-seven states have passed shield laws
36

See supranote 8.

37 See, e.g., Zelenka v. State, 266 N.W.2d 279, 286 (Wis. 1978).
38 See, e.g., Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir. 1979). According to
the Federal Rules of Evidence, the federal common law of privileges applies to all actions
in the federal courts that are based on federal law. FED. R. EvtD. 501. When a case
involves state law, the common law of the relevant state applies. Id. Journalists, like all
parties in federal cases, are also protected by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
prohibit the subpoenaing of material that is unnecessary or duplicative, FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(c), and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which prohibit the parties from
"fishing" for evidence that is not relevant or that would be inadmissible at trial. United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 700 (1974) (explaining FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)). The
federal rules also require courts to quash any subpoena that "subjects a person to undue
burden." FED. R. CIv. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(iv).
39 See, e.g., Senear v. Daily Journal-Am., 641 P.2d 1180, 1182 (Wash. 1982).

OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 71:1

providing statutory protection, 40 and the Justice Department has adopted
guidelines regarding the issuance of subpoenas against journalists in federal
cases. 4 1 The arguments used to justify these protections are equally varied.
But those differences are not merely the products of the peculiar situations in
which these issues arise; they are the result of broader conceptual
differences.
At the macro level, the rationales emphasized by supporters of the
privilege are separable by the degree to which they argue from policy versus
principle. Ronald Dworkin distinguishes these two by suggesting that a
policy "sets out a goal to be reached, generally an improvement in some
economic, political, or social feature of the community," whereas a principle
is "a standard that is to be observed... because it is a requirement of justice,
or fairness or some other dimension of morality. '42 Principle-based
arguments present the privilege as a fundamental right that is essential to
preserving people's investigative and expressive autonomy. 43 They treat the
privilege as a presumptive barrier that requires no contextual activation. The
protection exists and can only be overcome, if at all, by the presence of some
extraordinary condition. Policy arguments, on the other hand, emphasize the
social or individual benefits to be gleaned from the privilege and are more
focused on situation-specific calculations of costs and benefits.
Despite their differences, these frameworks are capable of overlapping
applications. Those arguing from policy could, depending on the values they
assign to the various benefits and detriments they identify, propose a
privilege that is even more protective than one outlined by someone arguing
from principle. 44 But pure arguments from principle are more likely to be
40

See Privilege Compendium, supranote 8.

41 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2009). These guidelines were originally promulgated in 1970
and currently require, inter alia, that the need for the information sought be balanced
against the First Amendment interests of the reporters, that reasonable attempts be made
to secure the information from other sources, and that federal prosecutors negotiate with
the media organization prior to issuing the subpoena. Id.
42
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (1977). Not only are those core
values the foundation for many constitutional provisions, the constitutional design itself
is an expression of principle, so that actions that conflict with the essential democraticgovernmental structure can be challenged as affronts to principle.
43 See, e.g., Victor Kovner, Are JournalistsPrivileged?,29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363,
1364 (2008); Frederick Schauer, Towards an InstitutionalFirstAmendment, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 1256, 1275 (2005); Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634
(1975).
44 This is possible in part because those arguing from principle are unlikely to favor
unqualified protections. No Supreme Court Justice has proposed an absolutist
interpretation of the First Amendment. Justices Hugo Black and William 0. Douglas
came close, see Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring) ("I
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made in support of broad reporter's privilege protections and are more likely
to be linked to constitutional provisions. Of course, much of the difference
between these approaches can be explained by the differences between
constitutional and statutory law. We expect those debating constitutional
provisions to argue from principle, because the Constitution exists in part to
preserve core liberties. Statutory law, on the other hand, is usually more
utilitarian and is designed to direct people's day-to-day social involvements,
so it would be reasonable to assume that the choice of framework is simply a
45
function of the legal context.
There is no clear alignment, however, of principle-constitutional on one
side and policy-statutory on the other, nor should there be. They often track
this way, but statutes are occasionally adopted in service of principle, to fill
in gaps left by the courts or to right the courts' errors. 4 6 Even though a right
read 'no law... abridging' to mean no law abridging"), but both allowed for some
exceptions. See also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515
(Black, J., dissenting) (rejecting symbolic speech claim by high school students
suspended for wearing armbands to protest Vietnam War). Constitutional scholars also
rarely advance absolutist arguments. But see Lyle Denniston, Absolutism: Unadorned,
and Without Apology, 81 GEO. L.J. 351, 354-56 (1992) (proposing an absolute rejection
of all limitations on expression, including laws and tort claims targeting libel, privacy,
false advertising or obscenity, among others).
45 Constitutions and statutes are not entirely disconnected; they are both sources of
law used to maintain a certain social order and advance the public good. This invites the
contention that the differences between them are merely structural and not substantive,
and that the establishment of tiers of protection is not only an arbitrary exercise, but
potentially anti-democratic in that the recognition of constitutional rights empowers the
courts to override the public will. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 16 (1962) (describing the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" presented by judicial
review). The opposite framework is one in which constitutional rights in general and
freedom of expression in particular are understood as "natural rights" or "moral rights"
that supersede other social interests. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A
FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 131 (1947) (describing free expression as a "moral right");
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 74-75, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (describing free expression as
one of several "inalienable" rights central to people's "inherent dignity"). One need not
subscribe to a natural-rights philosophy, however, to recognize that some interests are so
foundational-whether to individual dignity or to the proper functioning of democracythat they cannot be left fully exposed to the shifting whims of legislative bodies and
therefore require more durable expression in the law.
46 See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)) (eliminating arbitrary barriers to the exercise of the
franchise); Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2006) (limiting the
conditions under which law enforcement officials can search newsrooms). The latter act
was a direct response to the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize a constitutional
limitation on newsroom searches in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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does not exist until concretized by judicial ruling or constitutional
amendment, 4 7 the underlying principles can still be advanced through
statute.4 8 In the constitutional context, however, arguments from policy are
inapposite. Courts need not make judgments about the social good when
construing constitutional rights, because the good has already been
established. 49 Justice Hugo Black made a similar point when he noted that
where "freedoms are left to depend upon a balance to be struck... in each
particular case, liberty cannot survive. For under such a rule, there are no
constitutional rights that cannot be 'balanced' away." 50 Black overstated his
case; some balancing of interests is unavoidable in most constitutional
adjudication. 5 1 But that balancing must occur in the process of enforcing the
right, not in determining whether it exists in the first place.
This shifting of assumptions is one of the central errors courts are
making in reporter's privilege cases, and it is part of an insidious pattern in
which instrumental (policy) arguments are eclipsing fundamental-rights
(principle) arguments in both the constitutional and statutory settings, and in
popular discourse as well. Those arguments treat the privilege as occasionally
useful, perhaps, but not indispensible, and they tend to put forth a
circumscribed version of the privilege that encompasses only its most
politically salable protections. This is apparent in court rulings that

47 Some natural-rights theorists might contend that certain rights are inherent and

both precede and supersede the exercise of political power by civil governments;
conversely, some legal positivists would reject the notion of individual rights altogether,
or at least the existence of rights standing apart from people and the state. Compare, e.g.,
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961), with RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
(1986). Nevertheless, the reality is that the American constitutional system is based on
the recognition of enumerated rights, which establish presumptive-but not inviolablelimits on state power.
48 Indeed, the legislative response to Branzburg and other cases denying a reporter's
privilege ought to be regarded as attempts to give life to principles that some courtsthrough misinterpretation-have refused to recognize as elements of the First
Amendment.
49 The question in evaluating the Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment
is not whether a particular component protection is important or useful; it is whether the
component protection falls logically under the umbrella of the core protection.
50 Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399,423 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
51 This is particularly true when the requirements of two constitutional rights are in
conflict, as is often the case when journalists are subpoenaed in criminal cases. In those
instances, judges have no choice but to consider both the Sixth and First Amendment
interests. But they neglect the latter when they use the legal context to preemptively
declare the privilege altogether inapplicable.
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categorically exclude protections in certain types of proceedings 52 or against
subpoenas seeking certain types of information. 53 Instead of presuming that
the protection exists and allowing the subpoenaing party to overcome it by
pointing to some overriding condition, these courts use those conditions as
justification for rejecting the baseline protection in the first place, often
without any concomitant consideration of the harms that the subpoena
presents to the news organization. The same thing is occurring in the
legislative arena, where shield laws are loaded up with exceptions that allow

the privilege to be invoked in only certain contexts. 54 So, not only are
reporter's privilege protections usually qualified, in the sense that the shield
can be overridden, they are selective in that their availability is situational.
55
The former result is at least understandable in that no rights are absolute.
But the latter is irreconcilable with a principle-based,
56
constitutionally rooted, conception of the privilege.

much

less

Despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Branzburg v. Hayes,57 there is
substantial theoretical support for recognition of a First Amendment
reporter's privilege. Indeed, the Court drew from it when it acknowledged in
Branzburg that "news gathering is not without its First Amendment
protections" 58 and that "without some protection for seeking out the news,

freedom of the press could be eviscerated." ' 59 By recognizing that the First

Amendment goes beyond the protection of expressive freedom and also
encompasses the pursuit and acquisition of information, the Court seemed to
be working from a fundamental-rights model in which the press is
52

See, e.g., Judith Miller Subpoena, 397 F.3d 964, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (finding no

protection in criminal cases before grand juries, even in jurisdictions recognizing
qualified First Amendment privilege in civil cases).
53 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1998)
(acknowledging the existence of a qualified First Amendment privilege for confidential
source information but recognizing no protection for nonconfidential information).
54 See, e.g., Free Flow of Information Act, H.R. 985, 11 1th Cong. § 2(d), (e) (2009)
(the proposed House version of the Act does not allow the privilege to be claimed in
defamation cases, § 2(d), or in situations in which the journalist witnessed criminal
activity, § 2(e)); S. 448, 111 th Cong. §§ 3(a), 5 (2009) (the Senate version also contains
exceptions for observations of criminal activity and for issues related to national
security).
55 See supra note 44.
56 To use a trite example, the fact that someone might shout fire in a theatre and
cause a panic does not justify a government ban on speech in theatres. That is the
problem with these judicial and legislative exceptions: they ignore the nuances of
particular cases in the name of convenience, and are therefore prone to overbreadth.
57 408 U.S. 665 (1972); see also supra note 1.
58 Branzburg,408 U.S. at 707.
59
Id. at 681.
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autonomous from government and is endowed with a presumptive, though
not unconditional, right to seek out the news. The Court went further by
asserting that "liberty of the press is the right of the lonely
pamphleteer ... just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher." 60 This
more "egalitarian" 6 1 conception of the press is consistent with a
fundamental-rights approach in suggesting that constitutional protections
ought to be available to everyone equally. 62 Nevertheless, the Court's
resolution of the case was based on policy concerns 6 3 and on its
mischaracterization of the media litigants' claims as demands for "special
64
rights."
Several of the essential elements of a First Amendment reporter's
privilege were clearly embraced by the Supreme Court in Branzburg, and
some lower federal courts have built upon that foundation in recognizing
some form of the privilege. Their approaches and rationales vary, however,

Id. at 704. The Court added that "freedom of the press is a 'fundamental personal
right."' Id. (quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938)).
61 See Erik Ugland & Jennifer Henderson, Who Is a Journalist and Why Does It
Matter? Disentanglingthe Legal and Ethical Arguments, 22 J. MASS MEDIA ETHics 241,
246-47 (2007) (distinguishing an "egalitarian model" of the press in which "all citizens
are equally equipped and equally free to serve as newsgathering watchdogs" from an
"expert model" in which "journalists are conceived of as a uniquely qualified and clearly
identifiable collection of professionals who serve as agents of the public in the
procurement and dissemination of news.").
62 This assumes that the person claiming the right was engaged in the behavior that
the right was designed to protect-that is, the person was serving some "press" function.
But this connection is necessary for the invocation of any constitutional right. The Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial, for example, is a right that every citizen is entitled to
claim, even though only some people will ever have a need (by virtue of being charged
with a federal crime) to assert it.
63 The Court outlines an egalitarian conception of the press but then bemoans the
"practical and conceptual difficulties" of enforcing such a privilege, given that it would
require courts to "define those categories of newsmen who [would be] qualified" to claim
its protections. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 704. The Court seems to assume that the litigants
were seeking some special definition of the press that would reserve these protections for
only certain established news organizations. But if the Court had simply applied the
egalitarian definition it outlined, there would have been no special rights problem.
64
Id. at 683. The Court uses this language throughout its opinion: "'[T]he publisher
of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws. He has no
special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others."' Id. (quoting Associated
Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937) (emphasis added)). The Court added: "the
First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to
information not available to the public generally." Id. at 684 (citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965)) (emphasis added).
60

2010]

REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE

and need to be more clearly anchored to principle. 6 5 A principle-based
conception of the privilege must begin by treating the protection as a
presumptive right that does not depend for its recognition on a balancing of
interests, even if in the application of the right the protections occasionally
must yield to competing needs. Similarly, the protection cannot be
categorically withheld in certain types of cases or when only certain types of
information are sought. A principle-based conception views the privilege as a
bulwark against government encroachments on individuals' newsgathering
and expressive autonomy-including, but not limited to, its confidential
source relationships-not merely as a practical mechanism to foster
anonymous speech, 66 much less certain types of speech. Every journalist
subpoena therefore poses some risk, so it makes no sense to carve out
wholesale exceptions and to deny judges the discretion to make case-specific
67
determinations.
A principle-based conception of the privilege also requires application of
an egalitarian definition of the press so that the prerequisites for claiming the
privilege are focused on journalists' behaviors and expressive aims rather
than on their credentials or institutional affiliations. Policy-based conceptions
tend to focus on the qualifications or professional characteristics of
claimants, 68 which leads to clumsy categorizations that are inappropriate
when a "fundamental personal right" 69 is involved. That kind of rough
ordering is the province of policymakers who are given wider latitude to
discussion of these cases infra Part III.
66 This is perhaps a collateral benefit of recognizing the privilege, but it should not
65 See

be treated as a substitute rationale.
67 Indeed, the Court has rejected these categorical approaches in other First
Amendment cases. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), the
Court struck down a state law mandating closure of courtrooms in rape trials in which
minors would be testifying. The Court acknowledged the substantiality of the state's
interest in protecting the privacy and well-being of minor witnesses, but because the
rights of the press and public to observe these trials were "of a constitutional stature," the
Court held that preemptive closure violated the First Amendment and that judges must
have the discretion to weigh the countervailing interests on a case-by-case basis. Id. at
606-08.
68 This might be acceptable if there was something about those qualifications that
was inextricably linked to the distinguishing qualities of the underlying behavior. But in
this context, anyone can serve a press function by seeking out and communicating

information of public interest to a mass audience, whether or not their resumes bear the
traditional markers of professionalism.
69
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 704 (citing Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938)).
This is how the Court characterized the right to a free press in Branzburg, incorrectly
assuming that the media litigants viewed their journalistic credentials as being relevant to
their claim.

OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 71:1

draw approximate boundaries in the name of efficiency. But when acting
from principle, particularly when enforcing a constitutional right, there can
be less allowance for imprecision.
Those opposed to recognition of a reporter's privilege often suggest to do
so would be to bestow upon the press an affirmative right 7 -- or worse, a
special right7 1'-which the Court has refused to recognize in other First
Amendment cases. 72 They interpret the First Amendment as solely a shield
against government limits on expression, not as a shield against restraints
targeting non-expressive behavior. Scholars have long debated the extent to
which the First Amendment protects newsgathering, including whether the
Press Clause 73 and Speech Clause 74 have discrete constitutional meanings. 75
But under a principle-based conception of the privilege, that question is
largely beside the point. That framework presupposes a connection between
journalist subpoenas and expression-not in the indirect sense that without a
privilege, journalists' sources will be less forthcoming, but in the direct sense
that subpoenas can be used to harass and intimidate journalists, to interrupt

70 See, e.g., Kara A. Larsen, Note, The Demise of the First Amendment-Based
Reporter'sPrivilege: Why This Current Trend Should Not Surprise the Media, 37 CONN.
L. REV. 1235, 1256 (2005) (suggesting that the Court has rejected affirmative rights of
access for the press and that the Court in Branzburg rejected the journalists' pleas for
special rights).
71 See, e.g., McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003) ("We do not see
why there need to be special criteria merely because the possessor of the documents or
other evidence sought is a journalist.") (emphasis added); Michael Battle, Op-Ed., No
Special Privilege, USA TODAY, June 22, 2006, at A12; Adam Liptak, Courts Grow
Increasingly Skeptical of Any Special Protectionsfor the Press, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
2005, at A16.
72 See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (rejecting journalists'
First Amendment-based claim for access to county jail where murder had occurred);
Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (rejecting journalists' First
Amendment claim seeking access to inmates in federal prison); Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 834-35 (1974) (rejecting journalists' First Amendment challenge to the prison
rule prohibiting inmate interviews).
73 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom ... of the press .... ").
74
Id. ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom.., of speech .....
75 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 43, at 633 (suggesting that the Press Clause is a
structural provision that protects the autonomy of the institutional press). But see First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 799-800 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (rejecting the separate meaning of the two clauses and suggesting that the
Press Clause is merely an extension of the Speech Clause's protection of expressive
freedom).
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their investigations, and to impair their standing as independent watchdogs. 76
The connection between subpoenas and journalists' speech is increasingly
neglected in courts' analyses.
The principle-based conception of the privilege is a necessary framework
in the First Amendment context, but it should not be abandoned in the
statutory context either. Those who seek recognition of the privilege ought to
work from the assumption that shield laws are merely alternative expressions
of a broader principle and an attempt to supply protections that the courts
have denied. The choice of frameworks is critical and will often determine
the scope of the protections and the category of people entitled to claim
them. Because of this, it matters how these cases are litigated and how the
issues are framed. It also matters how they are presented in popular
discourse, because policymakers, and occasionally judges, take actions that
are either directly responsive to popular sentiment or at least mindful of the
77
limits of public tolerances.
These are issues addressed more fully in Part IV. Part III, however,
provides a portrait of the current state of the law and the shifts occurring in
the judiciary by showing how courts are characterizing the privilege, what
frameworks they are favoring, and how those choices are driving their
conclusions. Broadly speaking, it is clear that the great period of reporter's
privilege expansion that began after Branzburg ended in the late 1990s or
early 2000s.
III. JUDICIAL RULINGS AND RATIONALES
In the three-plus decades since Branzburg, lower federal courts have
forged their own idiosyncratic frameworks regarding the scope of the First
Amendment and whether it protects reporters against subpoenas and other
impairments of their newsgathering activity. Underlying their doctrinal
differences are divergent conceptions of the central purposes of the First
Amendment and whether it is merely a guarantor of expressive freedom or
whether it also protects against less direct restraints that affect journalists'
autonomy. The Court's indefinite decision in Branzburg (which the Court has

76

It must also be emphasized that while most news organizations consider the

"watchdog function" to be part of their core mission, the freedom to seek out, acquire,
and disseminate information is a "fundamental personal right." Branzburg, 408 U.S. at
704 (quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938)). The reporter's privilege,
despite its unfortunate name, is therefore better understood as an individual right with a
structural purpose.
77 See infra Part Ill.
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stubbornly refused to revisit 78) is the source of most of the uncertainties in
this area of law. Not only was the Court divided with respect to the outcome
in Branzburg, issuing what is often described as a 4.5-to-4.5 ruling, it gave
almost no consideration to autonomy principles and how they might be
threatened by subpoenas. The closest the Court came was a brief
acknowledgement at the end of its opinion that subpoenas issued in bad-faith
would present "wholly different issues. ' 79 The Court saw no inherent
problem with journalist subpoenas, however, and would presumably only
reach a different conclusion where there was evidence of a deliberate plan to
intimidate the press. But because that sort of evidence is almost impossible to
discover, the Court's brief caveat about harassment was a minor concession.
The Court's opinion contains no consideration of the impact of
subpoenas on either journalists' expression-that is, their willingness to
address controversial issues-or their actual or perceived independence from
government or other powerful interests. 80 Instead, the Court dismissed the
as audacious demands for special rights, 8 1 built around a
journalists' claims
"speculative" 82 claim that sources would dry up in the absence of a
privilege. 83 The Court even questioned the value of confidentiality, saying
that many anonymous sources are self-interested subversives or scofflaws

78 See, e.g., Judith Miller Subpoena, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reh "g denied,
405 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Scarce v. United States), 5 F.3d 397 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, Scarce v.
United States, 510 U.S. 1041 (1994); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.
1987), afg 652 F. Supp. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), cert. denied,481 U.S. 1015 (1987).
79 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707. The Court added that "[o]fficial harassment of the
press undertaken not for purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a reporter's
relationship with his news sources would have no justification." Id. at 707-08.
80
See id at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissenters addressed this squarely by
noting, among things, that in the absence of some protection against subpoenas, officials
could "annex the journalistic profession as an investigative arm of government." Id.
81 See, e.g., id. at 683 ("The Court has emphasized that '[t]he publisher of a
newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws. He has no
specialprivilege to invade the rights and liberties of others."' (quoting Associated Press
v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937) (emphasis added))); id. at 682 ("The claim is,
however, that reporters are exempt from these obligations .... This asserted burden on
news gathering is said to make compelled testimony from newsmen constitutionally
suspect and to require a privilegedposition for them." (emphasis added)); id. at 690 ("We
are asked to... interpre[t] the First Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege
that other citizens do not enjoy.").
82 Id. at 694. The Court does not explain why it is not equally "speculative" to
suppose that sources would not dry up.
83 Id. at 691. ("Nothing before us indicates that a large number or percentage of all
confidential news sources... would in any way be deterred by our holding ... ").
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who do not deserve to have their identities concealed. 84 Finally, the Court set
up a bogus contest between the press and law enforcement by suggesting that
the "heart of the [press'] claim is that the burden on news gathering resulting
from compelling reporters to disclose confidential information outweighs any
public interest in obtaining the information." 8 5 But the press litigants never
suggested that their interests were transcendent-only that they were real
and that they ought to be acknowledged through some kind of balancing
approach. Nevertheless, the Court, emphasizing the nature of the underlying
proceeding (a grand jury inquiry), 86 resolved the issue categorically,
permitting judges to entirely disregard the press' interests, absent some
evidence of a gross abuse of process.
In the decades since Branzburg, many lower federal courts have
corrected some of the Court's errors by limiting the Branzburg precedent to
the grand jury context and recognizing a First Amendment or federal
common law privilege in other contexts. 87 But there is no unanimity among
the federal courts, much less the state courts. Some have refused to recognize
a privilege altogether, 88 while others have recognized an incomplete version
of it that limits the protection to particular types of information (e.g.,
confidential but not nonconfidential), 89 proceedings (e.g., civil but not
criminal), 90 or claimants (e.g., traditional but not non-traditional
journalists). 9 1 In each of these cases, much like in Branzburg itself, the
results have been shaped by the alignment of the courts' approaches with
either the policy-instrumental or principle-autonomy conceptions of the
84 Id. at 697 ("Neither are we now convinced that a virtually impenetrable
constitutional shield.., should be forged to protect a private system of informers
operated by the press to report on criminal conduct, a system that would be
unaccountable to the public, would pose a threat to the citizen's justifiable expectations
of privacy, and would equally protect well-intentioned informants and those who for pay
or otherwise betray their trust to their employer or associates.").
85 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681 (emphasis added).
86 Id.
87 See supra note 8.

88 See, e.g., Storer Commc'ns Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1987).
89 See, e.g., McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 532-33 (7th Cir. 2003).
90 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1998).
91 Overall, the federal courts have been more willing to embrace a broad definition
of journalist than have the state courts or legislators drafting state shield laws. A typical
contemporary definition is outlined in von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144
(2d Cir. 1987), which requires that the person claiming the privilege had "the intent to
use the material-sought, gathered or received-to disseminate information to the public
and that such intent existed at the inception of the newsgathering process." Other courts
take a narrower view. See, e.g., In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1998)
(reserving the protection to those engaged in "investigative reporting").
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privilege. The significance of these divisions has plainly been revealed in the
past few years, as hundreds of journalists have been subpoenaed, 92 dozens
have been held in contempt, and several have spent time in jail for refusing to
comply, 93 while Congress and the state legislatures continue to debate the
94
necessity and scope of statutory protections.
A. Shifting Frameworks:A New PathologicalPeriod
Perhaps the highest-profile reporter's privilege case since Branzburg was
decided in 2005 by the D.C. Circuit Court. The case involved a First
Amendment and federal common law challenge to subpoenas issued by
special prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald in the grand jury inquiry into illegal
leaks at the White House. Fitzgerald wanted to know who leaked to the press
that Valerie Plame Wilson was an undercover CIA agent. 95 Then-New York
Times reporter Judith Miller and Time magazine reporter Matthew Cooper
were two of several journalists subpoenaed by Fitzgerald to reveal the
identities of their confidential sources. Both refused to comply and tried
unsuccessfully to quash the subpoenas. After Federal District Court Judge
Thomas F. Hogan rejected the reporters' requests for relief,96 they appealed
to the D.C. Circuit, which ruled unanimously against them. 97 Both Miller and
Cooper were eventually ordered to prison for contempt, but Cooper avoided
jail time after securing a waiver of his confidentiality agreement with the
source, Vice President Dick Cheney's chief of staff, Lewis "Scooter" Libby.
Miller also secured a waiver from Libby but only after spending 85 days in
98
prison.
Despite the abundant divisions among the circuit courts on the reporter's
privilege and on the meaning of Branzburg, the D.C. Circuit's opinion was
less an exploration of core rationales than a fortification of Branzburg and an
attempt to definitively end the ability of journalists to shield themselves
against subpoenas, at least in the grand jury context. The court exalted
92 See Jones, supra note 18, at 643.
SHIELDS AND SUBPOENAS, supra note 27.
94 See supra note 8; see also infra Part III.B.
95 Many people have alleged that this was an orchestrated attempt to exact revenge
against Valerie Wilson's husband, Joseph Wilson, who had criticized the Bush
Administration's claims about Saddam Hussein's weapons programs. See Don Van Natta,

93 See

Jr. et al., The Miller Case: A Notebook, a Cause, a JailCell and a Deal, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.

16, 2005, at Al, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/16/national/16leak.htm.
96 In re Special Counsel Investigation, 338 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19 (D.D.C. 2004).
97

Judith Miller Subpoena, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reh 'g denied,405 F.3d 17

(D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005).

98 See Van Natta et al., supra note 95, at Al.
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Branzburg as if it were the lodestar of the free-press firmament, arguing that
not only is its meaning "clear," 99 but its conclusions are "absolute and
unreversed."' 10 0 The D.C. Circuit simply glossed over Branzburg's
ambiguities, which have puzzled judges and legal scholars for decades and
which have triggered the splits among the circuits.1 01 To do that, of course,
the court had to first abate the nuisance of Justice Powell's concurring
opinion, which it conveniently characterized as a near-complete endorsement
of Justice White's opinion for the Court rather than a deliberate attempt by
Powell to soften the Court's definitive tone. 102 The D.C. Circuit also ignored
the divisions among the circuit courts, flatly declaring Branzburg to be
"without doubt.., the end of the matter." 103 Finally, and most importantly,
the D.C. Circuit made no effort to articulate either the instrumental or
fundamental rights arguments that some courts have thoughtfully explored in
crafting their approaches to the privilege. Indeed, Judge David Sentelle, who
wrote the opinion for the D.C. Circuit, added a concurring opinion in which
he warned of the troubles that would befall courts if they recognized a
privilege: Would the privilege be absolute or qualified? 10 4 Would news take
precedence over law enforcement? 10 5 Would journalists be immune from the
obligation all citizens have to expose criminal wrongdoing? 10 6 Would
amateur bloggers undermine the judicial process by exploiting the courts'
definitions of "journalist" and "the press"? 10 7 Sentelle implied that these
issues were both new and insurmountable, even after acknowledging that
99 Judith Miller Subpoena,

397 F.3d at 978; see also id.
at 970 ("Unquestionably,

the Supreme Court decided in Branzburg that there is no First Amendment privilege
protecting journalists from appearing before a grand jury or from testifying before a
grand jury or otherwise providing evidence to a grand jury regardless of any confidence
promised by the reporter to any source. The Highest Court has spoken and never revisited
the question.").

100 Id.
at 970.

101 The court's opinion is replete with conclusive characterizations of Branzburg's

meaning. It notes at the outset that there is "no material factual distinction" between

Branzburg and the present case. Id.at 969. It adds that the Supreme Court "in no
uncertain terms rejected the existence [of a reporter's] privilege," and that its reasoning
was "transparent and forceful." Id.at 969-70.
102 Id. at 971 ("Justice Powell's concurring opinion was not the opinion of a justice
who refused to join the majority. He joined the majority by its terms, rejecting none of
Justice White's reasoning on behalf of the majority.").
103 Judith Miller Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 970.

104 Id.
at 981.
05
1 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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courts and legislatures have been dealing with them for decades. 10 8 Not only
was Sentelle's conclusion (that Branzburg provides no relief to journalists in
the grand jury context) questionable, but his opinion presents a challenge to
the very idea of a reporter's privilege. In making that argument, he not only
treated the logistical bothers as sufficient grounds for denying the privilege,
but he also made no attempt-in either his concurrence or his opinion for the
court-to confront the arguments that dozens of state and federal courts have
embraced.
Judge David Tatel was the only one on the panel who made that effort,
although it was in a concurring opinion, and he put most of his emphasis on
the instrumental benefits of the privilege. 10 9 Tatel agreed with the other two
justices on the disposition of the First Amendment claim, 1 0 but he rejected
the door-slamming absolutism of Sentelle's majority opinion and
concurrence. I l l He also argued that while Branzburg provided the decisional
rule with respect to Miller and Cooper, Branzburg was "not the end of the
story"'112 and that "reason and experience" augur for recognition of a
qualified privilege under federal common law. 1 13 In making that case, Tatel
provided a concise articulation of some of the rationales undergirding the
privilege, stating that it is "obvious" that compelling a reporter to expose
confidential sources presents "First Amendment problems" 114 and that undue
interference with those relationships would impair the press'
"constitutionally chosen" role of "keeping officials elected by the people
responsible to all the people whom they were elected to serve." 115 In
addition, it would create "chilling effects" by inhibiting the candor of sources
16
and impairing "the press's truth-seeking function.""

10 8 Id. at 979-81.
109 Judith Miller Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 991-93 (Tatel, J., concurring).
110Tatel wrote that because Miller and Cooper were similarly situated to the
Branzburgplaintiffs, the court's "hands are tied," and Branzburg controls. Id, at 988.
111 Id. at 987 (highlighting Branzburg's "internal confusion" and the "enigmatic"
concurrence of Justice Powell).

112Id. at 988.

113 Id. at 987-89 (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13 (1996)).
114 Id. at 987 (quoting in part Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
15 Judith Miller Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 991-92 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384
U.S. 214,219 (1966)).
116 Id. at 991. Tatel added that under those circumstances, "[r]eporters could reprint
government statements, but not ferret out underlying disagreements among officials; they
could cover public governmental actions, but would have great difficulty getting potential
whistleblowers to talk about government misdeeds; they could report arrest statistics, but

not gamer first-hand information about the criminal underworld." Id.
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* The split between Tatel and Sentelle, which mirrors the broader divisions
among the federal courts, was on display once again in an even more recent
D.C. Circuit case, Lee v. Department of Justice, 1 7 involving scientist Wen
Ho Lee's Privacy Act suit against the FBI and the Departments of Energy
and Defense. Lee alleged that government officials, in an effort to expose Lee
as a Chinese spy, leaked private employment information to the press about
Lee's work at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.' 18 Lee subpoenaed
several reporters in order to learn the identity of those responsible for the
leaks."l 9 The journalists challenged the subpoenas, but their motions to quash
12 1
were rejected, 120 and the D.C. Circuit affirmed the denials.
Judge Sentelle again wrote the opinion for the court, concluding that
while Lee was different than Branzburg because it involved a civil claim
rather than a grand jury inquiry, and while the court's prior ruling in Zerilli v.
Smith 122 required some balancing of interests, that balance nevertheless
favored mandatory disclosure of the reporters' source information. Sentelle
might have preferred not to recognize a privilege at all, 123 but under Zerilli,
courts must ensure that subpoenas of non-party journalists (1) go "to the
heart of the matter," 12 4 and (2) are imposed only after the subpoenaing party
has "exhausted every reasonable alternative source of information." 12 5 Once
again, Sentelle offered no examination of the underlying rationales for those
requirements and concluded that because Lee's suit depended on learning the
26
identity of the leakers, the Zerilli test was clearly satisfied.1

117 Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reh'g denied, 428 F.3d
299 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
118 Lee was indicted on 59 counts of espionage, but entered a plea agreement in
which all of those charges were dropped except one relating to the mishandling of
sensitive data. Id. at 55.
119 Id. at 56.
120 Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 401 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2005).
121 Lee, 413 F.3d at 56.
122 Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
123 Judge Sentelle noted that "[n]ot only the breadth ... but [the] very existence" of
the reporter's privilege "has long been the subject of substantial controversy," Lee,
413 F.3d at 57, and that the Supreme Court in Branzburg "flatly rejected" the privilege
and "expressly refused" to recognize it in the grand jury context. Id. He also seemed to be
referring to himself when he added that "some would read the absolute language of the
Supreme Court as foreclosing the possibility of any such privilege under any
circumstance" Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
124 Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 713 (internal quotations omitted).
125 Id.

126 Lee, 413 F.3d at 61.
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After the ruling, the reporters sought review by the full circuit court, but
the request was denied. 127 Judge Tatel, who criticized his colleagues' blunted
interpretation of Branzburg in the Judith Miller case, dissented from the
court's rehearing denial in Lee, filling in the substantive gaps left by the
majority and exposing its inadequate accounting of the First Amendment
interests at stake. 128 He acknowledged that the majority applied the required
elements of Zerilli but said that the test itself is inadequate and does not
really balance the "public and private interests. ' 129 Tatel pointed out that in
leak cases, the elements of centrality and exhaustion will almost always be
satisfied, yet there are situations in which the public interest in the leak
outweighs the interests of the party seeking to discover the source. 130 The
remedy, which Tatel spelled out in his earlier Miller concurrence, is that:
courts applying the privilege must consider not only the government's need
for the information and exhaustion of alternative sources, but also the two
competing public interests lying at the heart of the balancing test.

Specifically, the court must weigh the public interest in compelling

127 Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 428 F.3d 299, 300 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

128 Id. at 301 (noting the public's "manifest interest in an unfettered press" and the
risk of letting "trivial litigation... trump core First Amendment values."). Tatel also
emphasized the value of press independence and how it "ensures that citizens are 'able to
make informed political, social, and economic choices."' Id. at 302 (quoting in part
Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 711.).
129 Id.at 301.
130 Id. at 302 ("It's hard to imagine how [Lee's] interest could outweigh the public's
interest in protecting journalists' ability to report without reservation on sensitive issues
of national security."); see also Judith Miller Subpoena, 397 F.3d 964, 996-97 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (Tatel, J., concurring):
Of course, in some cases a leak's value may far exceed its harm, thus calling
into question the law enforcement rationale for disrupting reporter-source
relationships. For example, assuming Miller's prize-winning Osama bin Laden
series caused no significant harm, I find it difficult to see how one could justify
compelling her to disclose her sources, given the obvious benefit of alerting the
public to then-underappreciated threats from al Qaeda. News reports about a recent
budget controversy regarding a super-secret satellite program inspire another
example.... [I]t seems hard to imagine how the harm in leaking generic
descriptions of such a program could outweigh the benefit of informing the public
about billions of dollars wasted on technology considered duplicative and
unnecessary ....
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disclosure, measured by the harm the leak caused, against the public
31
interest in newsgathering,measuredby the leaked information's value.

Tatel's proposed public-interest balancing component is a sensible
solution to some of the obvious limitations of the most widely used balancing
criteria. And while it does raise its own set of complications by forcing courts
to make subjective judgments about the relative value of particular stories
and disclosures, there may be no other way to ensure that the First
Amendment interests are adequately protected. 132 Second Circuit Judge
Robert Sack recently endorsed Tatel's approach, although in a dissenting
opinion, 133 and the Senate's version of the proposed federal shield law
contains a similar provision. 134 No recent court rulings, however, have added
135
a public-interest component, and some have explicitly dismissed the idea.
One of those courts was the D.C. District Court, which refused to quash
subpoenas issued to journalists as part of a Privacy Act claim filed by former
Army scientist Stephen Hatfill.1 36 Several news organizations had profiled
Hatfill after he had been named "a person of interest" in the 2001 anthrax
attacks in Washington, D.C. and New York City. 137 Hatfill, who claimed that
anonymous government officials had leaked private information about him to
reporters covering the investigation, subpoenaed dozens of reporters in the
131 Judith Miller Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 997-98 (Tatel, J., concurring) (emphasis
added). Tatel ultimately concluded that Miller and Cooper's interests were outweighed by
the government's need for their source information. But he noted that his conclusion
would have been different if the leak had been "either less harmful or more newsworthy."
Id. at 987.
132 Indeed, Tatel's balancing test does not go far enough in that it does not take full
account of the impact of subpoenas on press autonomy. Whether or not these interests are
explicitly made part of the balancing test, they ought to be among the extrinsic
considerations that courts take into account when applying the balancing test. See
discussion infranote 141 and accompanying text.
133 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 185-86 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sack, J.,
dissenting) [hereinafter Islamic Charities].
134 Free Flow of Information Act, S. 448, 111 th Cong. § 2(a)(3) (2009) (prohibiting
federal courts from compelling discovery of journalists' information unless
"nondisclosure of the information would be contrary to the public interest, taking into
account both the public interest in compelling disclosure and the public interest in
gathering news and maintaining the free flow of information.").
135 See Islamic Charities, 459 F.3d at 171-72; Hatfill v. Gonzalez, 505 F. Supp. 2d
33, 46 (D.D.C. 2007); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, Fainaru-Wada & Williams, 438
F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2006) [hereinafter BALCO].
136
Haofll, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 35-36.
137 See Judith Miller, Scientist Files Suit over Anthrax Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,
2003, at A13.
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case in order to learn the identity of the leakers. D.C. District Court Judge
Reggie Walton refused to quash the subpoenas. Without engaging in any
serious examination of the First Amendment implications of the subpoenas,
Walton largely discounted the reporters' interests, insisting that confidential
sources are not a "public good of transcendent importance" 138 and repeating
the Branzburg canard that reporters who seek to protect their sources must
139
believe "it is better to write about crime than to do something about it."
Walton added that "the protections of the Privacy Act do not disappear when
the illegally disclosed information is leaked to a journalist, no matter how
newsworthy the government official may feel the information is." 140 That is
certainly true, but it is also beside the point. The journalists never questioned
the public interest in enforcing the Privacy Act; they simply argued that that
interest does not trump all others and that some attempt should be made to
measure the value of enforcing the law against the collateral costs of that
enforcement, which is what Judge Tatel's balancing formulation seeks to do.
Tatel's test is peculiar to leak cases, but it points to a broader problem,
which is that courts' analyses typically focus on the interests and needs of the
subpoenaing party while failing to adequately account for the First
Amendment costs of forced disclosure. They assume that the creation of the
balancing test itself provides a sufficient accommodation, often ignoring the
specific admonitions of the courts that created the tests. The D.C. Circuit in
Zerilli, for example, clearly intended that in working through elements of the
test, courts should have their thumb on the journalists' side of the scale, and
that in most cases the "litigant's interest in disclosure should yield to the
journalist's privilege.' 14 1 These extrinsic considerations are supposed to
inform the evaluative process but are often neglected in the courts'
mechanical application of the explicit provisions.' 4 2 Without serious
138 Hatfll, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 45 (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11

(1996)).

139 Id. at 36 (quoting Branzburg,408 U.S. at 692).

140 Id. at 37.

141 Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 712. Zerilli was involved in a civil case, but there is no
reason to believe that the court's guidance would not apply to criminal cases as well,
even though the need evaluation might be different.
142 The Supreme Court appeared to provide such a limitation when it noted in
Branzburg that "[wie do not expect courts will forget that grand juries must operate
within the limits of the First Amendment as well as the Fifth." Branzburg, 408 U.S. at
708. The Court offered a similar proviso in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, when it refused to
recognize a First Amendment limit on newsroom searches but later acknowledged that
the standard warrant requirements must be applied with "particular exactitude when First
Amendment interests would be endangered by the search." 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978). As
a practical matter, however, these caveats have not provided journalists with additional

protection.
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consideration of the values at stake, however, the balancing process is afait
43

accompli.1

What complicates this is that the interests of the journalists are often
harder to define and measure than those of the subpoenaing party. In criminal
cases, for example, the defendants often have a focused need for specific
information that relates to an actual case before the court. The journalists'
interests, on the other hand, are often remote in the sense that they relate to
future consequences 144 or abstract in the sense that they are less
demonstrable. 145 This is especially true when journalists defend themselves
by using principle-based arguments, which are often accompanied by
references to the watchdog function, autonomy, the Fourth Estate, and so on,
all of which can be perceived by some as platitudinous. Principle-based
arguments might be harder to articulate and substantiate, but they cannot be
ignored if courts are to achieve "the proper balance between the public's
interest in the free dissemination of ideas and information and the public's
interest in effective law enforcement and the fair administration of
justice."' 4 6 Furthermore, the media litigants should not have to go to
extraordinary lengths to make clear to courts what is at stake in these cases.
Judges have a special obligation to identify the important constitutional
issues that are affected, and, to the extent that any balancing is required, to
look at the long-term consequences and not just the exigencies of the case at
147
bar.
143 Judge Merrick Garland made a similar point in his dissent to the rehearing denial
in Lee, noting that if "the reporter's privilege is limited to those requirements [centrality
and exhaustion], it is effectively no privilege at all." Lee, 428 F.3d at 302 (Garland, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing).
144 The concern of many journalists is that surrendering their source information
will impair their ability to work with and secure information from future sources. So,
calculating all the harms associated with press subpoenas-at least those seeking source
information-necessarily requires a degree of speculation on the part of the courts.
145 To some extent the interests of journalists are linked to the broader public
interest in media independence, which can be impaired in ways that are both real and
symbolic. The latter is no less consequential; it diminishes the broader standing of the
press and the public's confidence in its ability to serve as the public's proxy in
monitoring powerful interests. But that symbolic consequence is not one that can readily
be measured.
146 DOJ Guidelines on Media Subpoenas, 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(a) (2006).
147 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 736, n. 19 (Stewart, J., dissenting):
It is the duty of courts to give legal significance to facts; and it is the special
duty of this Court to understand the constitutional significance of facts. We must
often proceed in a state of less than perfect knowledge, either because the facts are
murky or the methodology used in obtaining the facts is open to question. It is then
that we must look to the Constitution for the values that inform our presumptions.
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Unfortunately, the less searching approach taken by the D.C. Circuit in
Miller and Lee, and by Judge Walton in Hatfill, is increasingly familiar to
journalists fighting subpoenas in federal courts, particularly in grand jury
cases. Most of the recent cases in the federal circuits have involved either
grand jury proceedings or investigations by special prosecutors, which are
treated similarly, 14 8 and in every case the journalists have lost:
* In 2001, the Fifth Circuit refused to overturn a contempt order
against freelance reporter Vanessa Leggett, who defied a grand jury
subpoena seeking notes and recordings from interviews she conducted with
two imprisoned murder suspects. 149 Leggett spent 168 days in jail.
* In 2004, the First Circuit let stand a contempt order against Rhode
Island TV reporter James Taricani who had refused to respond to a grand
jury subpoena issued in the investigation of the "Operation Plunder Dome"
scandal in Providence. 150 Taricani was sentenced to six months of home
confinement for refusing to divulge the source of a videotape showing a
51
government official accepting a bribe.'
* In 2006, the Ninth Circuit refused to overturn a contempt order
against video blogger Josh Wolf, who had challenged a grand jury subpoena
seeking his testimony about, and video outtakes of, a violent protest in San
Francisco. 152 Wolf spent 226 days in jail-the longest sentence ever served
153
by a journalist in a contempt case.
* Also in 2006, the Second Circuit overturned a district court ruling
that had prohibited Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald from subpoenaing a
telephone company for the phone records of New York Times reporters Judith

And the importance to our society of the full flow of information to the public has

buttressed this Court's historic presumption in favor of First Amendment values.

148 See In re Special Proceedings, James Taricani, 373 F.3d 37, 44-45 (1st Cir.
2004) [hereinafter TaricaniProceedings].
149 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, Vanessa Leggett, 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2301
(5th Cir. 2001).
150 TaricaniProceedings,373 F.3d at 44-47.
151 Taricani had used portions of the videotape in an on-air report about the scandal.
152
1n re Grand Jury Subpoena, Joshua Wolf, 201 F. App'x 430, 431, 434 (9th Cir.
2006).
153 Vanessa Leggett was the previous holder of this dubious record.
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Miller and Philip Shenon. 154 Fitzgerald wanted to know who tipped off the
reporters about a planned government raid on an Islamic charity suspected of
funding terrorists.1 55 After the reporters refused to volunteer the information,
Fitzgerald subpoenaed their phone records.
In addition to these circuit court decisions, most federal district courts
have also taken a jaundiced view of privilege claims in grand jury cases.
Perhaps the best known of these cases is the 2006 ruling against San
1 56
Francisco Chronicle reporters Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams.
As part of their coverage of the grand jury investigation of the Bay Area
Laboratory Cooperative (BALCO)157-a pharmaceutical lab that secretly
manufactured and distributed illegal steroids-the reporters published stories
containing information from sealed transcripts that had been leaked to them
by a confidential source. 15 8 The Justice Department subpoenaed the reporters
to learn the identity of the leaker, and the reporters moved to quash. District
Judge Jeffrey White rejected the motion, stating that Branzburg controls and
that the Supreme Court's "holding is clear."' 59 Nevertheless, even under the
narrower view suggested by Justice Powell's concurrence, 160 the reporters
were not entitled to any relief, Judge White held, because there was no abuse
of the grand jury process and because learning the identity of the leaker was
essential to determining whether that person had committed perjury or
violated a protective order.1 6 1 Judge White also followed the lead of the
154 Islamic Charities, 459 F.3d at 162-63.
155 The Times published two stories about the government's investigation of the
charity. See Judith Miller, US. to Block Assets It Says Help FinanceHamas Killers, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at A9; Philip Shenon, A Nation Challenged: The Money Trail,N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2001, at B6. The government claimed that these stories alerted the
charity's leaders that they were being investigated, which effectively thwarted the
government's plan to raid the charity and freeze its assets.
156 BALCO, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 1111.
157 BALCO owner Victor Conte was eventually charged and convicted of various
federal crimes. Several others have been convicted or charged as well, and the BALCO
grand jury investigation is still ongoing after more than four years. See Nathaniel Vinton,
Is This the End ofBALCO?, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 1, 2009, at 72.
158 The source, defense attorney Troy Ellerman, eventually came forward and
admitted that he had supplied the information to the reporters. This negated the need for
the reporters' testimony and the subpoenas were withdrawn. Ellerman, however, was
punished for contempt. See Teri Thompson, No Deal! Judge Shocks BALCO Leaker,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 15, 2007, at 88.
159

BALCO, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 1117.

160 Id.
1611Id. at 1118.
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recent circuit cases by refusing to recognize a federal common law privilege,
62
adding that even if one applied, it had been overcome by the government.1
The rejection of the reporters' First Amendment claims in these cases
was not entirely unexpected. The courts were hemmed in by Branzburg,
which, even when read through the lens of Powell's concurrence, provides
only limited support for recognition of constitutional protections against
grand jury subpoenas. These courts went too far, however, by essentially
arguing against the need for any serious First Amendment scrutiny of grand
jury subpoenas and suggesting--explicitly and implicitly-that such
protections ought to be denied to reporters in other types of proceedings as
well.
The recent grand jury cases are remarkable for several other reasons. One
is that while the courts carefully articulated "the needs of law
enforcement,"' 163 they provided no examination of the autonomy principles
that support the privilege, 164 nor any acknowledgement of the risks posed by
journalist subpoenas. Indeed, some of these courts explicitly rejected any
empirical connection between effective journalism and protection against
subpoenas. 16 5 The courts expressed no sympathy for the journalists, nor were
the courts' applications of Branzburg in any way grudging. Like Judge
Sentelle in Miller and Lee, these courts exalted Branzburg, presenting it as an
unqualified and unambiguous renunciation of the privilege, 166 tersely
rejecting any claim that the First Amendment has a significant role to play in

162 Judge White followed the three-part test articulated in Shoen v. Shoen (Shoen fl),
48 F.3d 412, 416 (9th Cir. 1995), which requires the subpoenaing party to show that the
information is "(1) unavailable despite exhaustion of all reasonable alternative sources;
(2) noncumulative; and (3) clearly relevant to an important issue in the case." Judge
White concluded with little elaboration that the government had satisfied these
requirements. BALCO, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.
163 Islamic Charities,459 F.3d at 185.
164 Judge White's opinion in BALCO did offer some prefatory acknowledgement of
the importance of a free press and noted that the ability to promise confidentiality to
sources is "essential in assisting the press in" its task of "informing the citizenry [about]
public events and occurrences." BALCO, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 1114-15 (quoting in part
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965)). But that was the full extent of it.
165 See, e.g., TaricaniProceedings, 373 F.3d at 44 (pointing to the doubt expressed
by the Branzburg Court about the harms that subpoenas posed to newsgathering).
Interestingly, none of these recent federal decisions notes the Branzburg Court's
acknowledgment that "news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,"
Branzburg,408 U.S. at 707, and that "without some protection for seeking out the news,
freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Id. at 681.
166 Most did acknowledge that harassment or bad faith would be a problem, but that
is simply what Branzburg requires. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707.
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these contexts, and refusing to seriously consider recognition of a federal
common law privilege.
The starkest example of this was Judge Richard Posner's 2003 opinion
for the Seventh Circuit in McKevitt v. Pallasch,167 which some believe was
the decision that triggered the recent reevaluation of Branzburg by other
federal courts, although the backslide probably started earlier.16 8 In McKevitt,
the court refused to stay a district court order compelling three reporters to
turn over tape recordings of interviews they had conducted with a key
witness in the Irish criminal trial of an alleged terrorist. 169 This was a nongrand-jury case involving nonconfidential information, so its facts were
distinguishable from Branzburg. Nevertheless, Judge Posner and his
colleagues on the panel interpreted Branzburg as an almost unqualified
rejection of the privilege, which was unaffected by the procedural or
substantive context. The court also read Powell's concurrence as essentially
no limitation at all, concluding that Powell's concerns about subpoenas being
used to impair journalists' "First Amendment freedoms"' 170 could be
17 1
ameliorated by the application of a "reasonable in the circumstances" test.
But those "circumstances" would not require the application of heightened
scrutiny, because, the court explained, the reasonableness test was the same
one applied to all federal subpoenas under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.172 Posner hammered home the point by stating, "We do not see
why there need to be special criteria merely because the possessor of the
documents or other evidence sought is a journalist. ' 17 3 Perhaps Powell would
agree about the need for special criteria, but he surely did not expect existing
criteria to be applied identically to both journalists and non-journalists or it
would have been unnecessary for him to write separately. 174 The Seventh
167 McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
168 See United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1998).
169 McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 535. The subject of the interviews was David Rupert, who
was expected to testify against Michael McKevitt. McKevitt was on trial in Ireland for
organizing terrorist activities and for being a member of a banned group. Id. The
reporters were working on a biography of Rupert, which was the impetus for the
interviews. Id.
170
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
171 McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 533.
172 Id. (citing FED. R. CIM. P. 17(c), as interpreted by CSC Holdings, Inc. v. Redisi,
309 F.3d 988, 993 (7th Cir. 2002)).
173 Id. Posner could be accused of contradicting himself by dismissing the need for
special protections while at the same time establishing a test that would take account of
the First Amendment interests at stake.
174 Powell's suggestion that courts evaluate journalist subpoenas on a case-by-case
basis was clearly made in recognition of the unique and constitutionally significant risks
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Circuit's McKevitt opinion, however, is devoid of anything that would
suggest a changed application of the normal criteria. The court did not
seriously examine the First Amendment concerns, 175 it explicitly rejected the
autonomy arguments emphasized by other courts, 176 it discounted the
connection between the subpoenas and the speech of the journalists, 177 and it
essentially recast the journalists' interests as being about the protection of
their intellectual property rather than about either their autonomy or
78
expression.'
The federal courts' drawback on the reporter's privilege is not limited to
the peculiar context of grand jury proceedings. Some courts have begun to reread Branzburg in other criminal cases as well. These contextual issues are
described more fully in Part IV.C, but the most striking example is United
States v. Smith. 179 In Smith, a television reporter sought to quash a subpoena
seeking outtakes of an interview with a criminal defendant in an arson
case.1 80 The Fifth Circuit overturned the district court's decision to quash the
subpoena,] 8 1 reading Branzburg (as limited by Powell's concurrence) as only
prohibiting subpoenas that amount to harassment of the press.1 82 "In the
end," the Court held, "Justice Powell's concurrence highlighted a limit on the

that those subpoenas pose-something the Branzburg majority even seemed to accept
when it said, "We do not expect courts will forget that grand juries must operate within
the limits of the First Amendment as well as the Fifth." Branzburg,408 U.S. at 708.
175 Although the court acknowledged that "newsgathering and reporting activities of
the press are inhibited when a reporter cannot assure a confidential source of
confidentiality," it did not elaborate except to note that confidentiality was considered by
the Branzburg Court to be insufficient grounds for quashing a grand jury subpoena.
McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 532.
176 Id.at 533; see also discussion infra Part III.B.
177 Posner did this by suggesting that the journalists' sole speech interest was in
publishing their planned biography. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 535 ("No showing has been
made, or would be plausible, that the reporters will have to abandon the Rupert biography
if the information contained in the recordings of their interviews with him is made
public.").
178 Id.at 533-35. Posner suggests that the journalists' real concern was in
preventing McKevitt from appropriating the recorded interviews, which would reduce
their value. Id.at 533-34.
179 United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1998).
180 Id.at 967.
181 United States v. Smith, No. 96-117, 1996 WL 371702 (E.D. La. July 2, 1996).
182 Smith, 135 F.3d at 969. ("Justice Powell's separate writing only emphasizes that
at a certain point, the First Amendment must protect the press from government
intrusion.").
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government's subpoena power also recognized by the plurality opinion."' 183
The Fifth Circuit essentially interpreted Powell's concurrence as a
redundancy by suggesting that it only reiterated a point made in the opinion
of the Court. 184 The Fifth Circuit rejected recognition of any broader
privilege in the criminal context and, in dicta, largely rejected the privilege
altogether, not only by reading Branzburg narrowly but by dismissing the
core autonomy concerns expressed by the media litigants as "speculative at
85
best."1
All of these federal reporter's privilege cases, beginning roughly with
Smith and Leggett and continuing today, could mark the beginning of a
realignment of the reporter's privilege and perhaps an even broader First
Amendment retrenchment. Because most of these cases involved grand
juries, leaks, or both, the outcomes are not particularly alarming. The courts'
rationales and assumptions, however, suggest both a reinterpretation of
Branzburg and reconceptualization of the privilege. At the core of these
changes is a shift away from the kind of autonomy- and principle-based
arguments that have provided much of the privilege's theoretical footing over
the past two decades. These courts' analyses dismiss the connection between
subpoenas and journalists' expression, 186 they treat the privilege as solely a
newsgathering matter-and in so doing, remove it from the First
Amendment's core protections-and they only partly and perfunctorily
identify the longer-term harms and social-structural hazards of denying
protection. The First Amendment, in short, is largely inconsequential to both
the scope and application of the limited protections recognized in these
recent opinions, which, like many recent cases in the lower federal and state
courts, treat the privilege more like a gratuitous obstruction than a vital
87
constitutional right. 1
183

Id.

184

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709.

185 Smith, 135 F.3d at 970.
186 One aspect of the D.C. Circuit's rehearing denial in Lee that was not addressed
by the dissenters but that provides another example of the court's constricted view of the
First Amendment issues at stake was its evaluation of the standard of review. Under the
Supreme Court's ruling in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984), courts
are required to independently examine the trial court record in cases "raising First
Amendment issues." Id. at 499. The D.C. Circuit held that this limitation did not apply in
Lee because the discovery order did not interfere with the "journalists' right to print or
communicate anything they choose." Lee, 413 F.3d at 58.
187 This is not to say that these judges have no respect for the First Amendment;
only that they have, as Justice Stewart put it in his Branzburg dissent, "a crabbed view of
[it]" that undervalues "the critical role of an independent press in our society." 408 U.S.
at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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The remainder of Part III will examine some specific aspects of the
reporter's privilege and how they are affected by the courts' emphasis on
policy-based arguments. It will also draw upon some of the earlier cases to
provide a fuller picture of existing precedent and a sense of the trajectory
across the federal circuits.
B. Substantive Context: Confidentialv. Nonconfidential
The division between policy-based and principle-based conceptions of
the reporter's privilege is no more conspicuous than in courts' handling of
subpoenas for confidential versus nonconfidential information. Since
Branzburg-and, in fact, decades prior to that case188-the privilege has
been presented as a mechanism for preserving the privacy of interactions
between reporters and their sources. Courts have often borrowed from the
general law of privilege, drawing parallels between reporter-source
protections and longstanding protections for clergy-congregant, attorneyclient, husband-wife, and doctor-patient relationships. 189 All of these
privileges serve similar ends by preserving the confidentiality of the parties
so that they can be uninhibited in their communications with one another.
The reporter's privilege is different, however, in that its purposes extend
beyond the "parochial personal concerns of particular newsmen or
informants"' 190 to the broader societal need for a free flow of information
about public issues. 19 1 The reporter's privilege is also uniquely rooted in the
Constitution and is tied to the core principles and structural arrangements of
American democracy. Judges and lawmakers who equate the reporter's
188 The first time a journalist used the First Amendment as the basis for refusing to
comply with a subpoena was in Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 551 (2d Cir. 1958)
(refusing to overturn contempt order against journalist who refused to divulge
confidential source information in a libel suit brought by actress Judy Garland against
CBS). Reporters have relied on confidential sources since the earliest days of news
reporting. Most essays and political tracts in colonial papers were published under
pseudonyms, and there were many instances in which printers defied orders by colonial
governors to reveal the identities of the anonymous contributors. See LEONARD W. LEVY,
EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 189-90 (1985).
189 Each of these parties is generally free of any obligation to testify against the
other, although with various exceptions. See generally KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE (6th ed. 2009) (outlining the general rules under statute and common law

for testimonial privileges related to "Marital Communications," §§ 78-86, "Client and
Lawyer," §§ 87-97, and "Physician-Patient," §§ 98-105).
190 Branzburg,408 U.S. at 726 n.2 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
191 Even if one does not believe that the First Amendment compels recognition of
the reporter's privilege, it still bears a linkage to constitutional principles, which is not
true of most other privileges.
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privilege with other privileges usually overlook these features and tend to
engage in pro-con policymaking calculations that neglect these macro-level
features.
In the 1980s and 1990s, when many federal courts began to look past the
four-vote opinion of the Court in Branzburg and recognize some First
Amendment protections for reporters, those courts paid more attention to
these principle-constitutional arguments and the social interests served by
individual autonomy. In United States v. Cuthbertson,192 for example, the
Third Circuit overturned a contempt order against CBS after it refused to
comply with subpoenas seeking tapes and transcripts of dozens of interviews
that had been conducted by reporters for its 60 Minutes program. 193 The
court held that a qualified reporter's privilege applied even though the
identities of the interviewees were not confidential. "We do not think that the
privilege can be limited solely to protection of sources," the court wrote,
because "[t]he compelled production of a reporter's resource materials can
constitute a significant intrusion into the newsgathering and editorial
processes."' 194 The court added that it is senseless to differentiate between
subpoenas and subpoenas for nonconfidential
confidential-source
information, because both are capable of impairing the "free flow of
information to the public that is the foundation for the privilege."' 195 This was
clearly an argument from principle. The court did not condition recognition
of the privilege on the preservation of source anonymity and instead treated
press autonomy as the orienting value. Because autonomy is sacrificed to
some extent by all subpoenas, it is unacceptable to carve out content-related
categories, even though doing so might be a reasonable shortcut in the public
policy context.
The First Circuit employed a similar framework in 1988 in United
States v. LaRouche Campaign,196 which involved a press subpoena issued in
the criminal trial of presidential candidate Lyndon H. LaRouche. 197 The First
Circuit upheld a contempt order against NBC for refusing to submit for in
camera review outtakes of its interview with a prospective witness.
Nevertheless, the court recognized that the First Amendment reporter's
privilege, even if qualified, is not blind to the dangers posed by subpoenas
for nonconfidential information. "We discern a lurking and subtle threat to
192

United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980).

193 The interviews were conducted by 60 Minutes reporters as part of their
investigation of a restaurant chain whose owners were later indicted. Id. at 142.
194 Id. at 147.
195 Id.

196 United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176 (1st Cir. 1988).
197 Id. at 1177.
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journalists and their employers," the court held, "if disclosure of outtakes,
notes, and other unused information, even if nonconfidential, becomes
routine and casually, if not cavalierly, compelled."' 198 The court also
explicitly embraced the arguments made by NBC lawyers supporting the
extension of the privilege to nonconfidential information, which included:
'the threat of administrative and judicial intrusion' into the newsgathering
and editorial process; the disadvantage of a journalist appearing to be 'an
investigative arm of the judicial system' or a research tool of government or
of a private party; the disincentive to 'compile and preserve nonbroadcast
material'; and the burden on journalists' time and resources in responding to
99
subpoenas. 1
These were among the arguments expressed by Justice Stewart in his
Branzburg dissent,200 and they had become, until recently, a common feature
of federal and state court opinions in privilege cases. In 1993, in Shoen v.
Shoen, the Ninth Circuit overturned a district court's contempt order against
an investigative book author who refused to turn over notes and transcripts of
interviews he had conducted with the defendant in a defamation case. 20 1 The
court noted at the outset that the reporter's privilege is "[r]ooted in the First
Amendment" and is a recognition of "society's interest in protecting the
integrity of the newsgathering process, and in ensuring the free flow of
information to the public. '20 2 On the question of the privilege's applicability
to nonconfidential information, the court noted with approval each of the key
justifications outlined by the First Circuit in LaRouche and embraced by
other federal circuits. 20 3 It also highlighted some related arguments from
legal scholars, 204 concluding that "this body of circuit case law and scholarly
authority [is] so persuasive that we think it unnecessary to discuss the

198
199

1d. at 1182.
Id. (quoting in part, without attribution, the arguments of NBC).

(Stewart, J., dissenting). Although Stewart did not
address the distinction between confidential-source subpoenas and others subpoenas, he
clearly highlighted the social-structural dangers posed by all press subpoenas, noting, for
example, that without some protection against subpoenas, "state and federal authorities
[could] undermine the historic independence of the press by attempting to annex the
journalistic profession as an investigative arm of government." Id.
201 Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993).
202 Id.at 1292.
200 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725

203 Id. at 1294-95.
204Id. at 1295.
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question further." 20 5 Unfortunately, in the more recent case involving Josh
Wolf, the Ninth Circuit took into account the nonconfidential nature of the
materials sought in a grand jury case, saying, "[n]one of the authorities cited
by either Wolf or the amici requires the district court to conduct a balancing
test where, as here, there is no showing of bad faith and the journalist refuses
to produce non-confidential material depicting public events." 20 6 The Ninth
Circuit's Wo/fopinion does not mention Shoen.
In 1999, the Second Circuit weighed in with a decision that offered a
thorough examination of the relevance of confidentiality to the recognition
and application of the privilege. In Gonzales v. National Broadcasting
Company,20 7 the court upheld a contempt order against NBC, which had
refused to turn over and testify about nonbroadcast footage from a "Dateline"
investigation about unwarranted police traffic stops. But in doing so the court
made clear that the reporter's privilege applies to both confidential and
nonconfidential information and that subpoenas focused on the latter ought to
be subjected to a balancing test 20 8 similar to the one that the Second Circuit
applies to confidential source subpoenas. 20 9 The court noted that the broader
purpose of the privilege is to protect the "paramount public interest in the
maintenance of a vigorous, aggressive and independent press capable of
2 10 That
participating in robust, unfettered debate over controversial matters."
interest is not uniquely jeopardized by confidential-source subpoenas, so, as
205 Id. ("Accordingly, we hold that the journalist's privilege applies to a journalist's
resource materials even in the absence of the element of confidentiality.").
206 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Joshua Wolf, 201 F. App'x 430, 432 (9th Cir. 2006).
207 Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999) (Gonzales 11). The court's ruling
was actually an amended opinion to an earlier decision in which the court flatly rejected
any privilege for nonconfidential information. Gonzales v. NBC, 155 F.3d 618 (2d Cir.
1998) (Gonzales 1). In Gonzales I, the court not only dismissed NBC's claim that its
reporters' ability to gather information could be undermined by forced disclosure of
nonconfidential information, it noted that the added scrutiny of journalists' editorial
process might be a good thing that could "make the final news product more complete,
accurate and reliable." Id. at 624.
208 The court held that "[w]here a civil litigant seeks nonconfidential materials from
a nonparty press entity, the litigant is entitled to the requested discovery. .. if he can
show that the materials at issue are of likely relevance to a significant issue in the case,
and are not reasonably obtainable from other available sources." Gonzales 11, 194 F.3d at
36.
209 The court noted that compliance with confidential-source subpoenas can only be
compelled "upon a clear and specific showing that the information is: highly material and
relevant, necessary or critical to the maintenance of the claim, and not obtainable from
other available sources." Id. at 33 (quoting In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680
F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1982)).
210 Id. at 33 (quoting Baker v. F. & F. Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972)).
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the court noted, there is no need for a strict division in which nonconfidential
subpoenas are entirely outside the scope of the privilege. 2 11 In Gonzales II,
the Second Circuit echoed many of the arguments made by the courts in
Shoen,21 2 LaRouche,2 13 and Cuthbertson,2 14 all of which were reflective of a
principle-based conception of the privilege, 2 15 even though the Gonzales II
court based its decision on federal common law rather than the First
2 16
Amendment.
During the 1980s and 1990s, none of the other federal circuit courts
directly addressed the nonconfidential question, but there were favorable
district court decisions in nearly every one of those circuits. 2 17 What emerged
211

Nevertheless, the court held that journalists' interests in cases involving

nonconfidential subpoenas are "narrower" and ought to be more "easily overcome" than
in cases involving confidential-source subpoenas. Id. at 36. As a result, the test
established by the court in Gonzales is "less demanding" in the former context than in the
latter. Id.
212 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1993).
213 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir. 1988).
214 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980).
215 The court appeared to recognize protection for nonconfidential information in
von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987) ("unpublished resource
material likewise may be protected") and arguably in In re Petroleum ProductsAntitrust
Litigation, 680 F.2d 5 at 7, but in Gonzales I the court was more explicit and provided a
more complete elucidation of the underlying rationales:
If the parties to any lawsuit were free to subpoena the press at will, it would
likely become standard operating procedure for those litigating against an entity that
had been the subject of press attention to sift through press files in search of
information supporting their claims. The resulting wholesale exposure of press files
to litigant scrutiny would burden the press with heavy costs of subpoena
compliance, and could otherwise impair its ability to perform its duties-particularly
if potential sources were deterred from speaking to the press, or insisted on
remaining anonymous, because of the likelihood that they would be sucked into
litigation. Incentives would also arise for press entities to clean out files containing
potentially valuable information lest they incur substantial costs in the event of
future subpoenas. And permitting litigants unrestricted, court-enforced access to
journalistic resources would risk the symbolic harm of making journalists appear to
be an investigative arm of the judicial system, the government, or private parties.
194 F.3d at 35.
216 Although this is often regarded as a positive decision for the press because the
court acknowledged the need to protect nonconfidential information, it was to some
extent a step backward in that prior to Gonzales II, the Second Circuit had applied the
stronger of the two tests to both confidential and nonconfidential information. See United
States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1983).
217 In the Fourth Circuit, see Stickels v. Gen. Rental Co., 750 F. Supp. 729, 732
(E.D. Va. 1990); in the Fifth Circuit, see Brinston v. Dunn, 919 F. Supp. 240, 242-43
(S.D. Miss. 1996); in the Eighth Circuit, see Cont'l Cablevision, Inc. v. Storer Broad.
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was a strong majority view among the federal courts that there is a First
Amendment--or, at the very least, a common law-basis for recognizing a
qualified reporter's privilege, and that this privilege extends to both
confidential and nonconfidential information. The pattern was similar in
many state courts. 2 18 This began to change in earnest in the very late 1990s
and early 2000s, when some district courts began retreating on the privilege
and scaling back protections for nonconfidential information, by either
adopting weaker standards or applying them less demandingly.
One case that stands out as a marker between the period of reporter's
privilege expansion and the more recent "pathological" period is the Fifth
Circuit's 1998 opinion in United States v. Smith.2 19 In that case, the Court
reversed the district court's decision to quash a subpoena 2 20 for
nonconfidential information in a non-grand-jury criminal case. The Court
read Branzburg as a full-throated rejection of the privilege. 221 It also
dismissed all of the arguments made by the media litigants-which several
other federal circuit courts had embraced, and which the Fifth Circuit itself
had accepted 18 years earlier 222-but without an explanation. The court
simply concluded that the idea of sources drying up as a result of excessive
press subpoenas was "speculative" 22 3 and dismissed out of hand any prospect
of a chilling effect resulting from a perceived "unholy alliance" between the

Co., 583 F. Supp. 427, 433 (E.D. Miss. 1984); in the Eleventh Circuit, see Kidwell v.
McCutcheon, 962 F. Supp. 1477, 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1996); and in the D.C. Circuit, see
Maughan v. NL Indus., 524 F. Supp. 93, 94-95 (D.D.C. 1981). The Sixth Circuit has not
addressed the issue, nor have its district courts, but the Sixth Circuit rejected the privilege
altogether in Storer Communications Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1987).

There were no favorable rulings in the Seventh or Tenth Circuits during this period,
although there have been some recently. In the Seventh Circuit, see Bond v. Utreras, No.
04 (C 2617), 2006 WL 1806387, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 2006); and in the Tenth Circuit,
see United States v. Foote, No. 00-CR-20091-01-KHV, 2002 WL 1822407, at *6 (D.
Kan. Aug. 8, 2002).
218 See, e.g., Kurzynski v. Spaeth, 538 N.W.2d 554, 557-59 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995);
State ex rel. Hudok v. Henry, 389 S.E.2d 188, 193 (W. Va. 1990); Austin v. Memphis
Publ'g Co., 655 S.W.2d 146, 149-50 (Tenn. 1983).
219 135 F.3d 963, 971-72 (5th Cir. 1998).
220 United States v. Smith, No. 96-117, 1996 WL 371702, at *2 (E.D. La. July 2,
1996).
221 The court argued that Branzburg rejected the notion of a privilege even in the
context of a confidential-source subpoena, so it would make no sense to recognize
protections in situations where the reporters' interests were even less compelling. Smith,
135 F.3d at 970.
222 Miller v. Transamerica Press, 621 F.2d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 1980).
223 Smith, 135 F.3d at 970.
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press and government. 22 4 The court obliterated the core argument for
constitutionalprotection by insisting that the press "is not differently situated
from any other business that may find itself possessing evidence relevant to a
criminal trial. '22 5 Of course, what differentiates the press is the First
Amendment, and while the court's conclusion would be defensible if the
media litigants had sought to reserve the privilege for particular types of
news organizations, 226 it is unlikely that they had such intentions, and even if
they did, it should not have prevented the court from elucidating a properly
circumscribed privilege built around a more egalitarian conception of the
2 27
press.
Five years after Smith, the Seventh Circuit accelerated the pullback on
nonconfidential source protection with its decision in McKevitt.228 Judge
Posner's opinion in that case was even more stark and dismissive than the
Fifth Circuit's Smith ruling.22 9 In McKevitt, the Seventh Circuit disputed the
constitutional basis for any form of the privilege, describing as "rather
surprising" 230 the rulings of those federal circuits that had recognized First
Amendment protections. Even after listing all of the circuit rulings
supporting protection for nonconfidential information, and noting that those
courts had "express[ed] concern with harassment, burden, [and] using the
press as an investigative arm of government,"'23 1 the court summarily
dismissed those concerns as if they were self-evidently illegitimate.
Although the court conceded that sources might be less forthcoming if
reporters were unable to promise confidentiality, it essentially held that
Branzburg's rejection of the greater interest in protecting confidential
information included a rejection of the lesser interest in protecting
nonconfidential information. 232 The McKevitt court went beyond merely
complying with what it believed was mandatory authority, however. It
224

Id. Of course, the real problem with such a perception is not the risk of a chilling
effect but the diminution of the press' credibility-and perceptions of its independence
and trustworthiness-in the eyes of the public.
225 Id.

226 Perhaps that is what the Court assumed when it criticized the media's reference
to the protection as an .'institutional' privilege." Id. at 969.
22 7
See Ugland & Henderson, supra note 61.
228 339 F.3d 530, 534-35 (7th Cir. 2003).
229 Indeed, Posner criticized the Smith court's characterization of Branzburg as a
plurality. Id. at 532.
230 Id.

231 Id.at 533.

232 Id.at 532. This assumes, of course, that the entire opinion of the Court in
Branzburg was a majority opinion rather than (at least in part) a plurality.
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rejected entirely the value of protecting nonconfidential information 233 and
went so far as to suggest that compelling the reporters to disclose their
interview tapes and transcripts would enhance the First Amendment, which
is served by "publication rather than secrecy. ' 234 That specious bit of
reasoning provides an example of the practice described earlier in which
judges weigh the interests on both sides with only the shortest-term and most
2 35
readily measurable consequences in mind.
236 and state courts2 3 7
In the past decade, several federal district courts
have issued similarly narrow rulings on nonconfidential information,
sometimes in direct response to Smith and McKevitt,238 and often in
contradiction of their own earlier opinions issued during the period of
reporter's privilege expansion. 239 Reflected in those opinions is a set of
policy-based arguments and assumptions. One of these is that the media
litigants in reporter's privilege cases are similarly situated to all other
possessors of relevant evidence. That argument makes the most sense coming
from judges who seek to deny recognition of the reporter's privilege
altogether-those whose theory of the First Amendment is exclusively
focused on expressive freedom, for example. But that view misses the
233 Id. at 533 ("[I]t is difficult to see what possible bearing the First Amendment
could have on the question of compelled disclosure" of nonconfidential information.).
234 McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 533. The Court suggested that "the parties to this case are
reversed from the perspective of freedom of the press" because the journalists were
asserting a right to prevent disclosure of information. Id.
235 See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
236 See, e.g., Wilson v. O'Brien, No. 07 C 3994, 2009 WL 763785, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 20, 2009); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Joshua Wolf (201 F. App'x 430, 433-34 (9th
Cir. 2006); United States v. Hively, 202 F. Supp. 2d 886, 894-95 (E.D. Ark. 2002); In re
Ramaekers, 33 F. Supp. 2d 312, 316-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); United States v. Jennings, No.
97 CR 765, 1999 WL 438984, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 1999).
237 See, e.g., In re Inquest Subpoena (WCAX), 890 A.2d 1240, 1241-42 (Vt. 2005);
State v. Moody, 94 P.3d 1119, 1153 (Ariz. 2004); Astra USA, Inc. v. Bildman, 13 Mass.
L. Rep. 300 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2001); In re Owens, 517 S.E.2d 605, 605 (N.C. 1999)
(effectively overturned by subsequent passage of shield law); In re Union Pac. R.R. Co.,
6 S.W.3d 310, 312 (Tex. App. 1999).
238 See Wilson, 2009 WL 763785 at *6 ("This Court follows the Seventh Circuit's
lead [in McKevitt] by refusing to tread new legal ground."); In re Ramaekers, 33
F. Supp. 2d at 316-17 (relying on Gonzales I and Smith).
239 See, e.g., Hively, 202 F. Supp. 2d 886, 894 (rejecting protection for
nonconfidential information in contradiction of Continental Cablevision, Inc. v. Storer
Broadcasting Co., 583 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Mo. 1984)); In re Union Pac. R.R. Co., 6
S.W.3d 310, 312 (Tex. App. 1999) (rejecting protection for nonconfidential in
contradiction of Channel Two Television Co. v. Dickerson, 725 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. App.
1987)).
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connection between newsgathering and expression, and in any case it is one
to which few judges subscribe. Most judges, including the justices in
Branzburg, acknowledge that the First Amendment reaches more than just
the dissemination of information; 240 they simply contend that the state's
interests in accessing "every man's evidence" 24 1 outweigh those of the
journalists. But if the journalists have interests in these situations that are
constitutionally rooted, then by definition journalists are differently situated
than those who are not working under the umbrella of constitutional
protections. Furthermore, if journalists have constitutional protections in
these situations, and those protections extend to both the press' expressive
and investigative autonomy, then it makes no sense for judges to
categorically deny protection against subpoenas seeking nonconfidential
information, nor to create separate balancing tests for assessing confidential
and nonconfidential subpoenas.
Some courts have fashioned separate tests for nonconfidential subpoenas
based on the assumption that journalists' interests in those situations are less
substantial than when they are seeking to protect a source. 242 That might be
true in many instances, but certainly not all of them. Yet by automatically
affording journalists less protection in these situations, judges have no
opportunity to take account of and properly balance the unique interests
implicated in each case. This kind of policy-based shortcut is efficient,
24 3
perhaps, but inappropriate as a mechanism for applying constitutional law.
Throughout the period of reporter's privilege expansion when principlebased arguments were ascending, 244 some courts argued that no distinction
ought to be drawn between confidential and nonconfidential source

240

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707 ("[N]ews gathering is not without its First

Amendment protections"); id.at 681 ("[W]ithout some protection for seeking out the
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.").
241 Id. at 674 (citations omitted).
242 See, e.g., Gonzales 11, 194 F.3d at 35-36 (noting that journalists' interests are
"narrower" in nonconfidential subpoena cases). The Second Circuit in Gonzalez II
outlined separate tests for evaluating confidential and nonconfidential subpoenas. Id.at
33-36.
243 These kinds of shortcuts are more tolerable when the courts are applying the
privilege as a matter of common law or statutory law, but this Article suggests that even
in those contexts, courts ought to take a principle-based approach, which would mirror
the constitutional approached described here.
244 The Second Circuit provided one of the earliest examples. Baker v. F. & F. Inv.,
470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972) (arguing that the reporter's privilege serves the
"paramount public interest in the maintenance of a vigorous, aggressive and independent
press capable of participating in robust, unfettered debate over controversial matters.").
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subpoenas. 245 As the D.C. District Court held, subpoenas targeting
nonconfidential materials are "equally as invidious as the compelled
disclosure of... confidential informants." 24 6 That kind of argument is almost
impossible to find today. Courts have largely ignored the "lurking and subtle
threat" 247 warning from United States v. LaRouche Campaign and have
adopted a two-track approach in which nonconfidential subpoenas are
scrutinized separately and less exactingly than those targeting confidential
information. This drop-off is manifest through both the tests that courts have
adopted-the language of which is often so weak 248 that it adds little to the
protections already embedded in the rules of evidence and procedure 249-and
by the application of those tests by judges who seem to have either lost sight
of the social-structural dimensions of the privilege or have simply lost
patience with journalists.
The increasing proclivity of some courts to address the reporter's
privilege as matter of policy rather than principle is evident in several other
ways. Some courts attempt to differentiate the reporter's privilege from other
common-law privileges by citing sources like Wigmore's treatise on
evidence, which states that the presence of a confidential relationship should
be a prerequisite for recognition of any testimonial privilege. 250 However
245 See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d. 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1983); Kidwell v.
McCutcheon, 962 F. Supp. 1477, 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1996); United States v. Blanton, 534 F.
Supp. 295, 297 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Maughan v. NL Indus., 524 F. Supp. 93, 94-95 (D.D.C.
1981).
246 Maughan, 524 F. Supp. at 95 (citation omitted).
247 See United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir. 1988).
248 The Second Circuit is typical of many courts, employing two separate tests for
nonconfidential and confidential subpoenas. See Gonzales II, 194 F.3d at 33-36. Both
tests address the relevancy of the information sought, the need for its disclosure and the
ease with which the information is obtainable from other sources. But in nonconfidential
cases, the subpoenaing party only needs to show that the information sought is "relevant"
to a "significant issue" and is "not reasonably obtainable from other available sources."
Id. at 36. The confidential source test, meanwhile, requires that the information be
"highly material," "critical" to the claim, and "not obtainable from other available
sources." Id. at 33 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Some courts do not create
separate tests but note that confidentiality can be a component in the analysis. See, e.g.,
Tripp v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 284 F. Supp. 2d 50, 55 (D.D.C. 2003) (listing confidentiality
as one of four factors to consider in assessing subpoenas).
249 See supranote 38.
250 See, e.g., Storer Commc'ns Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1987)
(citing 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN

SYSTEM OF

EVIDENCE § 2286 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1940)):
Professor Wigmore suggested "four fundamental conditions" as predicates to
recognition of any privilege against disclosure of communications: (1) the

OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 7 1:1

pertinent Wigmore's insights might be to questions about the common law of
evidence, his criteria are irrelevant to matters of constitutional interpretation.
By summoning these kinds of sources, judges-including Justice White in
Branzburg,25 1 as well as other courts 252 and commentators 2 53-confuse
contexts by mixing policy concerns with judgments about principle. Even in
the common law context, Wigmore's propositions, crafted in the early 20th
century before any court had ruled on a reporter's privilege claim,2 54 are
hardly dispositive. As the Supreme Court has said, the overriding concern
when creating privileges is that they serve "public ends." 255 And certainly the
public is served by the recognition of privileges that seek to maintain an
active, independent and uninhibited press that can check powerful interests
and provide citizens with information they need to self-govern. Those
interests are reflected in the constitutional design and are among the
fundamental presuppositions of American democracy. They are threatened
any time the government calls upon a journalist to turn over, or testify about,
the products of their investigations, regardless of whether doing so threatens
256
a confidential relationship.

communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed;
(2) confidentiality must be essential to the maintenance of the relationship between
the parties; (3) the relationship must be one which, in the opinion of the community,
ought to be fostered; and (4) the injury that would inure to the relationship by the
disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for
the correct disposal of litigation. It is apparent [that] ...the last three of Professor
Wigmore's predicates are lacking.
251 408 U.S. at 690 n.29 (citing Wigmore to reinforce its refusal to recognize a
reporter's privilege under the First Amendment).
252See, e.g., Convertino v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 07-CV-13842, 2008 WL
4104347, at * 4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2008).
253 See, e.g., Christopher J. Clark, The Recognition of a QualifiedPrivilegefor NonConfidential JournalisticMaterials: Good Intentions, Bad Law, 65 BROOK. L. REv. 369,
387 (1999).
254 The first case in which a federal court addressed the constitutionality of
compelled disclosure from reporters was Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 549-50 (2d
Cir. 1958).
255 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996) (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
256 See Kidwell v. McCutcheon, 962 F. Supp. 1477, 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (noting
that whether or not confidential information is involved "is irrelevant to the chilling
effect" that "enforcement of a subpoena would have on information obtained by a
journalist in his professional capacity." (citing United States v. Blanton, 534 F. Supp.
295, 297 (S.D. Fla. 1982))).
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One final example of the ways in which policy-based approaches to the
reporter's privilege are evident is in the demands that courts make of the
media litigants and the tone they use in characterizing journalists' interests.
Many courts have expressed skepticism about the value of protecting
reporters--often employing the same kind of special-rights rhetoric used by
the Court in Branzburg2 57-and have flatly rejected the legitimacy of
journalists' fears about sources drying up or reporters' autonomy and
independence being undermined.2 5 8 Many recent opinions treat these
assertions by the press with a kind of sneering dismissal. In Gonzales 1, the
Second Circuit said it "seriously doubt[ed] that ... journalists' decisions on
what to publish will in fact be adversely affected by the possibility of having
their nonpublished, nonconfidential material subpoenaed," adding, with some
condescension, that the public would actually benefit from the added scrutiny
259
of editorial decisions that would be possible if the privilege were denied.
The Second Circuit ultimately reversed itself, but its initial opinion was like
many others in recent years in which the courts have based their denials of
260
the privilege on the journalists' inability to produce "empirical evidence'
that their sources would dry up or that the "threat of intrusion into [their]
news gathering and editorial process" was more than "speculative." ' 261 These
are peculiar expectations. The chilling effect on speech, the wariness of
sources, the broader symbolic damage to the image of the press when it
cooperates with government-none of these things is readily measurable, but
257 See supra note 81.
258 Id. at 691 ("Nothing before us indicates that a large number or percentage of all

confidential news sources.., would in any way be deterred by our holding that the
Constitution does not, as it never has, exempt the newsman from performing the citizen's
normal duty of appearing and furnishing information relevant to the grand jury's task."
(emphasis omitted)).
259 Gonzales v. NBC, 155 F.3d 618, 624 (2d Cir. 1998) (Gonzales 1) ("[T]o the
extent that the lack of a privilege may affect editorial decisions, it seems that this effect
may well accrue to the public's benefit. Specifically, to the extent that the threat of
subsequent analysis of editorial decisions increases the accountability of editors for their
presentation of the news, such scrutiny is likely to make the final news product more
complete, accurate and reliable.").
260
Id; see also Judith Miller Subpoena, 397 F.3d 964, 983 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(Henderson, J., concurring); United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1998)
(pointing to the lack of an "empirical basis" to believe sources will dry up or that
reporters will destroy records); United States v. Hively, 202 F. Supp. 2d 886, 889 (E.D.
Ark. 2002) ("Movants' bare assertion that certain testimony may implicate confidential
sources or information is insufficient to satisfy their burden on this issue." (emphasis
added)).
261 United States v. Jennings, No. 97 CR 765, 1999 WL 438984, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
June 21, 1999).
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they are no less real because of it. Indeed, the Supreme Court in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan showed no reluctance to rewrite the law of defamation
based purely on speculation that unrestrained libel suits by public officials
would chill speech.262 These demands for proof of harm are really misplaced
policy considerations that should have little bearing on the recognition of
rights, even if they might have some relevance to their application.26 3 Instead
of using a principle-based approach that presupposes certain harms
associated with forced disclosure, the court reverses the analytical order,
2 64
making the right itself contingent on the demonstration of those harms.
Throughout the expansion period, most courts began to move past some
of the obviously policy-based arguments of the Court in Branzburg.2 65 The
lower courts began to accept that the core issue was not the desire of
journalists to exempt themselves from the normal obligations of
citizenship; 2 66 it was to preserve the social and democratic role of the press
by giving its individual practitioners the widest possible latitude to seek and
disseminate truthful speech about matters of public interest. Even in cases
like Gonzales II and the two Shoen cases, in which the Second and Ninth
Circuits adopted weaker tests for nonconfidential information, they
acknowledged the core principles involved and carefully articulated the
press' concerns. In Shoen I, the court noted that the privilege is "[r]ooted in
the First Amendment" and in "recognition that society's interest in protecting
the integrity of the news gathering process, and in ensuring the free flow of
information to the public, is an interest 'of sufficient social importance to
justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the
administration of justice.' ' 267 And in Shoen 1, the court warned that "routine
court-compelled disclosure of research materials poses a serious threat to the
262 376 U.S. 254, 301 (1964).
263 In striking the balance between the press's interests and those of the subpoenaing
party, the courts might reasonably make some approximations of the relative harm caused
by forced disclosure versus the harm to the litigants resulting from the withholding of that
information. But that balancing should be subsequent to the initial determination that a
balancing of those interests is required.
264 Another example of this was in Islamic Charities, where the Second Circuit used
the merits of the underlying journalism to determine whether to attach any First
Amendment scrutiny in the first place. 459 F.3d 160, 171-72 (2d Cir. 2006)
(mischaracterizing the reporters' claims as being about their interest in "informing
targets" about "imminent law enforcement asset freezes/searches," and asserting that this
is "not an activity essential, or even common, to journalism.").
265 There were many of these, but perhaps the most stunning was the Court's
assertion that the press doesn't need a privilege because it "has flourished" for so long
without one. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 698-99.
266 Id. at 682.

267 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1993).
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vitality of the news gathering process." 2 68 Gonzales II provides an even more
detailed accounting of the interests of the press, despite the fact that the court
ultimately required the journalists to comply. Even though these courts' tests
and conclusions are not in line with a pure autonomy framework, they are
nevertheless suffused with principle-based reasoning and plainly stand apart
from the terse 269 and glib 2 70 opinions in some recent cases.
C. Legal-ProceduralContext
In addition to the increasing tendency of courts to separate confidential
and nonconfidential subpoenas-with some courts categorically denying
protection against the latter-many are employing a similar approach with
respect to the nature of the underlying proceeding. This was probably an
inevitable consequence of the Court's fractured ruling in Branzburg.Because
Branzburg involved the narrow context in which journalists observed
criminal acts and were subpoenaed by grand juries, and because Justice
Powell, who preferred a case-by-case approach, supplied the fifth vote, many
lower courts felt free to craft different standards in factually distinct cases.
The opinion of the Court in Branzburg was certainly an emphatic
renunciation of the privilege, but it was largely gutted by Powell's
concurrence.
Powell agreed with the Court's disposition of the cases in Branzburg, but
his concurrence is philosophically more compatible with the approach of the
dissenters than with the opinion of the Court. In the first line of his
concurrence, Powell makes clear that reporters have First Amendment rights
to gather news and to protect their sources. 27 1 He agreed that in the peculiar
contexts presented in that case, the rights of the reporters were outweighed
by the grand jury's interest in obtaining relevant evidence. But he clearly
endorsed the need for some protection, and, like the dissenters, suggested
that the subpoenaing party ought to be required to demonstrate that their
need272 for the information is sufficiently weighty and that it is relevant2 73 to
268 48 F.3d 412,416 (9th Cir. 1995).
269 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Joshua Wolf, 201 F. App'x 430 (9th Cir.
2006); Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
270 See, e.g., McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003); Taricani
Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 44-45 (1st Cir. 2004).
271 Branzburg,408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
272 Id.at 710 (noting that journalists may seek to quash subpoenas when their
"testimony implicates confidential source relationships without a legitimate need of law

enforcement.").

273 Id. (suggesting that journalists should be able to quash subpoenas "bearing only a
remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation.").
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the underlying claim-two of the three components of the dissenters'
274
proposed test.
Powell's concurrence plainly stands apart from White's opinion from
the Court in at least two ways. First, Powell recognized the need for a
privilege (at least for the protection of reporters' sources) and saw it as not
2 75
merely a desirable policy preference but a constitutional requirement.
Second, he did not link that protection to particular legal contexts, even
though the subpoenas in question in Branzburg happened to relate to grand
jury inquiries. Powell wrote separately because he wanted courts to have the
discretion to weigh the competing interests in each case. 276 Indeed, when
constitutional rights are implicated, the courts must be sensitive to the unique
facts presented, and, as Powell concluded, a "case-by-case [approach]
277
accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions."
In light of all this, it is surprising how many courts in recent cases have
re-read Branzburg entirely through the lens of the four-vote opinion of the
Court and have either ignored Powell's concurrence or treated it as an
irrelevant appendage. 27 8 The most strident denunciations of the privilege
have occurred in grand jury cases (Judith Miller, Joshua Wolf, James
Taricani, McKevitt, et al.) where the contextual parallels invite an easy
274 See supranote 1.
275 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasizing the need to
balance "vital constitutional and societal interests").
276 Powell might have believed that the legal context should be a factor in the
balancing of interests, but not that the privilege should be uniformly denied in particular
types of proceedings.
277 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). Powell distinguishes his
approach from the dissenters' by suggesting that the latter would give journalists the
power to completely ignore subpoenas in the absence of a specific demonstration by the
government that all three of the dissenters' proposed requirements were met. Id. at 710
n. 1. But that is generally not how this has worked in subsequent litigation and under the
state shield laws that incorporate Stewart's criteria. In most cases, the subpoena is served
on the journalists who then file motions to quash, at which point the courts apply the
criteria in evaluating the legitimacy of the subpoena. Perhaps Powell wanted journalists
to appear and to invoke the privilege on a more item-by-item basis. But to a great extent,
Powell's footnote raises a distinction without a difference.
278 It should be noted here that even during the expansion period, courts were
reluctant to extend much protection to reporters subpoenaed in grand jury cases. A typical
approach was employed by the Ninth Circuit, which held that in interpreting Branzburg a
limited balancing of First Amendment interests may be conducted only "where a grand
jury inquiry is not conducted in good faith, or where the inquiry does not involve a
legitimate need of law enforcement, or has only a remote and tenuous relationship to the
subject of the investigation." Scarce v. United States, 5 F.3d 397, 401 (9th Cir. 1993).
Nevertheless, the tone in the more recent cases is sharper and more dismissive and tends
to cast doubt on some of the theoretical bases of the privilege.
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absolutism. Those courts oversimplify, however, by using the legalprocedural context to categorically reject the privilege in all grand jury
proceedings. 279 Even if that is a reasonable reading of the opinion of the
Court in Branzburg,it is not likely what Powell had in mind when he sought
to preserve the discretion of judges to make case-specific assessments. It
would be fair for judges in particulargrand jury cases to draw parallels to
Branzburg and perhaps to conclude that the journalists' interests are
outweighed by the needs of the court. But it is impossible to read Branzburg
as requiring the categorical exclusion of protection in all grand jury cases
without dismissing or recasting the concurring fifth vote.
The various grand jury cases described in Part III.A illustrate both the
hostility with which privilege claims are being received and the simplicity
with which courts are reading Branzburg. But perhaps the more ominous
trend is the tendency of courts to extend the unqualified interpretation of
Branzburg to all criminal cases, not merely those involving grand juries. The
Fifth Circuit was explicit about this in United States v. Smith,280 saying there
is "little persuasive force in [the] distinction" between grand jury cases and
other criminal cases, 28 1 and other courts have recently declared or implied
that the criminal nature of the underlying case is dispositive of privilege
2 83
claims. 282 The federal district court ruling in United States v. Libby
typifies the new analytical approach. That case involved the criminal trial of
former Vice Presidential Chief of Staff I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, who was
charged with obstruction ofjustice and other crimes relating to his role in the

279 See Judith Miller Subpoena, 397 F.3d at 970:

Unquestionably, the Supreme Court decided in Branzburg that there is no First
Amendment privilege protecting journalists from appearing before a grand jury or
from testifying before a grand jury or otherwise providing evidence to a grand jury
regardless of any confidence promised by the reporter to any source. The Highest
Court has spoken and never revisited the question.
280 135 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1998).
281 Id. at 971. The court notes that Branzburg "gave no indication that it meant to
limit its holding to grand jury subpoenas." Id. (quoting Branzburg,480 U.S. at 690-91).
282 See, e.g., Taricani Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 44-45 (1st Cir. 2004); McKevitt v.
Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Libby, 432 F. Supp. 2d 26,
46-47 (D.D.C. 2006); United States v. Hivley, 202 F. Supp. 2d 886, 890-92 (E.D. Ark.
2002). For a state court example, see In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d I (Ind. 1998). Some
courts make reference to both the procedural (civil v. criminal) and substantive
(confidential v. nonconfidential) contexts without making clear which is most critical, or
whether they are to be considered in concert with each other. See, e.g., United States v.
Lindh, 210 F. Supp. 2d 780, 783 (E.D. Va. 2002).
283 432 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2006).
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illegal disclosure of classified information. 284 Several reporters were
subpoenaed to testify about their interactions with Libby and moved to
quash, citing both the First Amendment and federal common law. Judge
Reggie Walton acknowledged that the question of whether Branzburgapplies
to all criminal cases "is still wildly disputed" and cited several circuit court
cases addressing the issue.2 85 Interestingly, most of those courts required a
balancing test,286 and in only two cases (United States v. Smith287 and In re
Shain288) did the court find the privilege to be inapplicable. Nevertheless,
Walton concluded that the "reasoning in Branzburg applies with equal force
to [criminal trials] as it does in grand jury proceedings." 289 Furthermore, "it
would simply be inappropriate" to use the same standard in criminal cases
that courts use in civil cases, because 'the need for information in the
criminal context is much weightier.' ' 290 Not only are there concerns about
the rule of law in criminal cases, Walton wrote, 29 1 but those seeking
information in civil cases "[do] not share the urgency or significance" of
their counterparts in criminal cases where people's lives and liberties are at
stake.

292

Walton and the other courts that have employed the same analysis are
certainly correct that the subpoenaing parties in criminal cases will usually
have a more powerful claim to the information than the parties in civil cases.
But that does not mean all criminal subpoenas are intrinsically more vital
than civil subpoenas. Courts that work from that starting point are using
quintessentially policy-based assumptions, relying on probabilities and
generalizations. They are acting more like insurance actuaries, using inexact
but absolute categorizations, rather than caretakers of vital constitutional
interests. Indeed, these courts routinely emphasize the point that there are two
constitutional rights at stake in these cases that must be judiciously balanced,

284 Libby was accused of illegally disclosing the identity of undercover CIA agent
Valerie Plame Wilson. See Van Natta et al., supra note 95.
285 Libby, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 46.
286
Id. (citing United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir.
1988); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11 th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 520-21
(9th Cir. 1976)).
287 135 F.3d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1998).
288 978 F.2d 850, 853 (4th Cir. 1992).
289 Libby, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 46.
290 Id. (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 384 (2004)).
291 Id.
292 Id. (quoting Cheney, 542 U.S. at 384).
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yet they resolve this dilemma by completely abrogating the rights of the
press.293

These cases stand in contrast to the body of case law that developed in
the post-Branzburg period of expansion. Many courts from the mid-1970s
2 94
through the late-1990s confined Branzburg to grand jury cases
(occasionally reading Branzburg as providing at least some protections in
those cases 295), and they routinely extended the privilege to other criminal
cases as well. 296 As the Third Circuit argued in Cuthbertson, a journalist's
"interest in protecting confidential sources, preventing intrusion into the
editorial process, and avoiding the possibility of self-censorship created by
compelled disclosure of sources and unpublished notes does not change
because a case is civil or criminal. '297 This became the prevailing orientation
of most courts, which drew no initial distinctions between subpoenas in civil
versus criminal cases, even though they considered the nature of the
29 8
proceeding when executing their balancing tests.

293 See id (making a categorical distinction between criminal and civil subpoenas,
and suggesting that criminal subpoenas should be evaluated under the Court's Branzburg
framework, whether or not those subpoenas originate in the context of a grand jury).
294 See, e.g., Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1975).
295 See, e.g., Storer Commc'ns Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 1987)
(rejecting a general privilege but reading Branzburg and the Powell concurrence as
prohibiting the use of subpoenas to harass reporters and disrupt their relationships with
sources, and requiring that the subpoenas serve the legitimate needs of law enforcement
and be more than remotely or tenuously related to the underlying proceeding); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena of Williams, 766 F. Supp. 358 (W.D. Pa. 1991) (recognizing a
common law privilege in grand jury contexts).
296 See, e.g., Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431 (Va. 1974).
297 United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980).
298 As the Third Circuit noted in Cuthbertson:
A defendant's sixth amendment and due process rights certainly are not
irrelevant when a journalists' privilege is asserted. But rather than affecting the
existence of the qualified privilege, we think that these rights are important factors
that must be considered in deciding whether, in the circumstances of an individual
case, the privilege must yield to the defendant's need for the information.
Id. Some courts also made the nature of the proceeding an explicit component of their
balancing tests. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436-37 (10th
Cir. 1977). Silkwood was a civil case, but courts in that circuit apply the test across
contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Foote, No. 00-CR-20091-01-KHV, 2002 WL
1822407, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 8,2002).
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Some courts continue to employ the more protective standards, 2 99 but
many others are carving away the protections in criminal cases, with some
even denying the basic protections required under Branzburg.30 0 The Seventh
Circuit, in another opinion by Judge Posner, has gone so far as to say that
there is no "reporter's privilege in federal cases," civil, criminal or
otherwise. 30 1 None of these conclusions can be squared with the baseline
assumption of most courts that some First Amendment interests are affected
by the issuance of subpoenas. If that is true, as the Court in Branzburg
implied,30 2 and as Powell emphasized, 30 3 then some kind of accounting of
those interests must be made-not through predetermined classifications but
through nuanced, case-specific examinations. This is the way the Court has
typically resolved constitutional conflicts in other settings, 30 4 and it is the
only way to approach these issues as a matter of First Amendment law.
The balancing approach favored by most courts throughout the
expansion period and that many courts still apply is also the most compatible
with a principle-based conception of the privilege. A few courts have avoided
addressing the constitutional dimensions of the privilege by instead

299 See, e.g., Foote, 2002 WL 1822407 at *2 ("[The Court sees no legallyprincipled reason for drawing a distinction between civil and criminal cases when
considering whether the reporter's interest in confidentiality should yield to the moving
party's need for probative evidence.").
300 See Taricani Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 44-45 (1st Cir. 2004). The court noted
that in the First Circuit, past rulings require "that the disclosure of a reporter's
confidential sources may not be compelled unless directly relevant to a nonfrivolous
claim or inquiry undertaken in good faith; and disclosure may be denied where the same
information is readily available from a less sensitive source." Id. at 45. The court
questioned, however, whether even these minimal protections were constitutionally
required or were merely "prudential considerations." Id.
301 U.S. Dep't of Educ. v. NCAA, 481 F.3d 936, 938 (7th Cir. 2007).
302 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707 ("[N]ews gathering is not without its First
Amendment protections .... ").
303 Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The asserted claim to privilege should be
judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and
the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct.")
(emphasis added).
304 See Globe Newspapers v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606-11 (1982) (striking
down state law that excluded press and public from observing certain trial proceedings
without affording judges the discretion in each case to weigh the First Amendment
interests against the asserted need for closure); see also Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 561 (1976) ("The authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign
priorities as between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as
superior to the other.").
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recognizing the privilege as a matter of federal common law. 30 5 In doing so,
they have emphasized the fact that freeing press from unnecessary
impediments to its expressive or investigative activities is an important social
concern. They have also avoided the temptation to work from a purely
policy-based orientation and have provided robust protection that is not
306
contingent on the presence of particular substantive or procedural features.
There are certainly substantial grounds upon which to justify a common
law reporter's privilege. Courts have recognized protections for the
communications between husbands and wives and for psychotherapists and
their patients, so it requires no prestidigitation to justify protections for
journalist whose interests are linked to core social values enshrined in the
Constitution and whose activities serve not only their own ends but the
30
public's as well.

7

In light of all that has occurred since 1972, with lower courts delimiting
Branzburg and recognizing various forms of the privilege and with dozens of
state legislatures passing shield laws, there is an unusually strong foundation
for recognition of a common-law privilege. Some circuit judges have recently
made powerful arguments in favor of that recognition, including Judge Tatel
30 9
in Judith Miller,30 8 and Judge Robert Sack in Islamic Charities.
305 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Williams, 766 F. Supp. 358, 368 (W.D.
Pa. 1991). Federal courts are explicitly authorized to do this under Federal Rule of
Evidence 501, which was adopted three years after Branzburg. Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88
Stat. 1926 (1975). Privileges established under the rule must serve "a public good
transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for
ascertaining truth." Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (quoting Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
306 See, e.g., Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1998) (Gonzales 11); Riley v.
City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d
433 (10th Cir. 1977); In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Williams, 766 F. Supp. 358 (W.D.
Pa. 1991). Some courts, like the Second Circuit in Gonzales II, have limited their
holdings to the specific facts presented but have not sought to confine the common-law
protection to those contexts.
307 In Riley, for example, the court noted that its recognition of a privilege was
based, in part, on the "strong public policy which supports the unfettered communication
to the public of information and opinion ... " 612 F.2d at 715. The court added that this
privilege was "rooted in the First Amendment." Id at 718.
308 Judith Miller Subpoena, 397 F.3d 964, 991-95 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J.,
concurring).
309 Islamic Charities, 459 F.3d 160, 174-89 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sack, J., dissenting).
Sack argued that "[a] qualified journalists' privilege seems ... easily-even obviouslyto meet each of th[e] qualifications" required by the Supreme Court. Id. at 181. He added:
"The protection exists. It is palpable; it is ubiquitous; it is widely relied upon; it is an
integral part of the way in which the American public is kept informed and therefore of
the American democratic process." Id.
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Nevertheless, most of the recent court majorities have scoffed. 3 10 The First
Circuit was particularly blunt in the James Taricani case, dismissing the
common-law argument as "newly hewn" and insisting that it was "flatly
3 11
rejected" by Branzburg.
But the opinion of the Court in Branzburg is hardly conclusive on the
common law issue-indeed, Powell never spoke to it-and it is absurd to
suggest that judges should treat the Court's decades-old statements about the
common law as if they had been preserved in amber. Situations like this are
the common law's raison d'etre. Nevertheless, this is the state of things in
this pathological period where the rights of the press to gather news are both
attenuated and receding, and where some judges treat journalists' claims with
a palpable cynicism.
Part IV addresses some of the legislative responses to these shifts,
assesses the extent to which those remedies reflect principle- or policy-base
approaches, and looks at the broader discourse about the reporter's privilege
and what it says about (and how it affects) the scope and trajectory of the
law.
IV. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES AND EXTRA-JUDICIAL ARGUMENTS

If there is any cause for optimism in this pathological period, it is that
thirty-seven states have now passed shield laws-several just in the past few
years-and Congress is on the cusp of passing the Free Flow of Information
Act (FFIA), which would some provide statutory protection for journalists
subpoenaed in federal cases. These are good signs, and shield laws are useful
as far as they go. But they are no panacea. Their principal value is in
establishing some baseline protection that compels judges to engage in at
least some balancing. But the overall effect of these statutes is dependent on
the proclivities of judges and the vigor with which they apply the tests. As
media lawyer Mark Anfinson says, "[t]he balancing test-let's face it-is
putty in the hands of the court. It doesn't mean anything in an objective
sense. You've got to make your case." 3 12 That is harder to do at a time when
so many judges are inclined to doubt the hardship-much less injustice-of
compelled disclosure. Indeed, the retreat on the reporter's privilege has been
less about changes in the underlying legal-constitutional architecture than
about failures in the interpretation and application of those requirements.
310 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Joshua Wolf, 201 F. App'x 430, 433 (9th
Cir. 2006); In re Special Counsel Investigation, Matt Cooper, 332 F. Supp. 2d 26, 32
(D.D.C. 2004).
311 TaricaniProceedings,373 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2004).
312 Telephone Interview with Mark Anfmson, Lawyer and Counsel to the Minnesota
Newspaper Association (June 3, 2009).
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Some of the provisions of the congressional shield bills and state shield laws
are examined below with those realities in mind.
A. A FederalShieldLaw?
The most encouraging response to the regression in the federal courts has
been the effort by some members of the U.S. House and Senate to pass a
federal shield law. As of this writing, the House had, for the second time in
the past two sessions, overwhelmingly passed its version of the FFIA, while
the Senate bill had been approved by the Judiciary Committee but had not yet
been voted on by the full Senate. It is impossible to know whether, or when,
the full Senate will consider the bill, and it is even more difficult to predict
what form the legislation will take after going through a conferencecommittee grinder, but there are some serious problems with the raw
materials. Both bills are flawed, even though either one, if passed, would be a
step forward.
The House bill3 13 and the Senate bil 3 14 were both introduced in February
2009 and are identical to the bills introduced in 2007. 3 15 The two bills have
several similarities, the most important of which is that they would require
courts in federal cases to apply a balancing test before obligating journalists
to comply with subpoenas. The balancing tests in both bills are relatively
strong. Each would require the subpoenaing party to "exhaus[t] all reasonable
alternative sources" 316 and to demonstrate that the information sought is
either "critical" 3 17 or "essential" 3 18 to the resolution of the case. Both also
include a public-interest balancing provision that requires judges to uphold
subpoenas only where "the public interest in compelling disclosure of the
information.., outweighs the public interest in gathering or disseminating
3 19
news or information."
Although they provide some strong presumptive protection, both bills are
pockmarked with exceptions. Under the Senate bill, reporters have no shield
against subpoenas relating to criminal or tortious conduct that reporters
observe. 3 20 However, reporters are not automatically compelled to reveal the
313 H.R. 985, 11 1th Cong. (2009).

314 S. 448, 111 th Cong. (2009).
315 See supra note 13.
316 H.R. 985 § 2(a)(1); S. 448 § 2(a)(1).
317 H.R. 985 § 2(a)(2)(A)(ii), (B).
318 S. 448 § 2(a)(2)(A)(ii), (B).
319 H.R. 985 § 2(a)(4). The Senate bill's language is substantially similar. S. 448

§ 2(a)(3).
320 S. 448 § 3(a).
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sources of illegally leaked classified information, except where the leak
would harm national security. 32 1 Reporters are not protected when the
subpoena seeks information that could prevent kidnapping, death or
substantial bodily injury, 322 or where the information sought could assist in
the prevention of terrorism or other threats to national security. 32 3 Under the
House bill, reporters' confidential sources are also specifically exempted
from disclosure requirements unless the identity of the source is necessary to
protect against terrorism or other threats to national security, 324 to prevent
death or significant bodily injury, 325 or to reveal the identity of someone
responsible for disclosing a trade secret or other private information. 32 6 Both
bills would allow the privilege to be claimed in civil and criminal cases and
both rely on a preponderance of the evidence standard.
Despite their many virtues, each bill has a major limitation. The House
bill uses a definition of "journalist" that is far too narrow and only protects
those who regularly gather and disseminate news "to the public for327a
substantial portion of [their] livelihood or for substantial financial gain."
The Senate bill, meanwhile, has a much more egalitarian definition of
329
journalist 328 but only protects information linked to confidential sources, 330
which means the privilege would be inapplicable to 97% of subpoenas.
Neither of these conditions is acceptable under a principle-based conception
of the privilege, which would not permit distinctions to be made-as an
initial matter anyway-between confidential and nonconfidential
information, and which would extend the protections to anyone serving the
purposes of the underlying right, whether or not they do so for a living. Of
321 Id. § 2(a)(2)(A)(iii).
322
323

Id.§4.
Id.§ 5.

324 H.R. 985 § 2(a)(3)(A).
325 Id.§ 2(a)(3)(B).
326 Id. § 2(a)(3)(C).
327 Id. § 4(2).

328 Senate Bill 448, Section 8(2) says a "covered person" is anyone engaged in
journalism, which is defined in Section 8(5) as "the regular gathering, preparing,
collecting... of news or information that concerns local, national or international events
or other matters of public interest for dissemination to the public." The word "regular"
was deliberately added to exclude certain bloggers or freelancers who are not actively
engaged in journalism. Nevertheless, this is still a functional definition that is not limited
to professional journalists.
329

Id.§ 8(6).

330 Jones, supra note 18, at 643. It is also important to note that the vast majority of
subpoenas are issued in state courts, so the broader problems described in this Article
would not be substantially altered by passage of a federal shield law.
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course, Congress is not obligated to take a principle-based approach. It is free
to apply policy-based criteria and to outline the scope of the law using
whatever categories, exceptions or definitions it prefers. But when a law is
crafted in direct response to the failure of the courts to apply the
constitutionally appropriate framework, and when its ostensible purpose is to
serve principles that are foundational, both in terms of individual liberty and
the broader structural arrangement of our democratic system, then the ideal
framework would be one organized entirely around those principles.
Neither of these bills is a pure reflection of a principle-based conception
of the privilege, although both would certainly enhance the protections
available to many reporters, particularly those working in circuits like the
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh. The legislation would also add some predictability
to the law. Still, there would be a lot of work for courts to do in applying this
legislation. The same kinds of interpretive challenges that exist in the First
Amendment and common law contexts would carry over to this one as well.
What is "critical" or "essential" information? What constitutes a threat to
national security? How exhaustively do subpoenaing parties need to search
for "alternative sources" of information? Favorable rulings on these issues
will require an attitudinal shift within the judiciary and a willingness of
judges to put their thumbs back on journalists' side of the scale.
The other potential drawback of a federal shield law is that it could serve
to forestall judicial consideration of the First Amendment and common law
dimensions of the privilege. Courts might be inclined to treat the explicit
language of the statute as the essential framework and to end its analysis
there, treating the shield law as effectively preempting constitutional or
common law analyses. Courts in jurisdictions that already provide broader
protections than those afforded under the proposed federal shield law must
not allow their reporter's privilege doctrine to contract toward the narrower
protections of the statute. And those federal courts that have not addressedor that have not precisely defined-the constitutional or common law
iterations of the privilege should not allow passage of a shield law to preempt
or circumscribe those analyses.
B. State Shield Laws
The thirty-seven state shield laws provide a mixed assortment of
protections and exceptions that are only partially faithful to a fundamentalrights view of the privilege. Like all statutes, shield laws are negotiated
arrangements that tend to emphasize lowest-common-denominator
protections. Nevertheless, some shield laws are very protective and use
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balancing tests that put a heavy burden on the subpoenaing party, 33 1 and a
few states even provide absolute protection for confidential-source
information. 332 In other states, the tests are less demanding, 333 and some
employ softer criteria in civil cases 334 or when subpoenas seek
nonconfidential information. 335 The shield laws also use substantially varied
definitions of "journalist" and "press." The Alabama shield law, for example,
only protects those who are "connected with or employed by a newspaper,
,,336 The Eleventh Circuit interpreted this
radio or television station.
language as excluding protection for magazines, because they were not
specifically mentioned, 337 and certainly this language would not encompass
bloggers or other non-traditional journalists. Many other shield laws use
definitions similar to the Alabama law, sometimes adding words like
"business," 338 "accredited" 339 or "bona fide" 340 to further separate those
working for less mainstream news outlets.
Many of these laws were enacted before the explosion of online
communication and were the result of lobbying by mainstream media
organizations, so the shield-law definitions tend to reflect a professional or
expert definition of the press. 34 1 In addition, some of the exclusions
contained in these laws might be artifacts of the give-and-take legislative

331 See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW

§ 79-h(c) (Gould 2009) (providing absolute

protection for confidential information and requiring disclosure of nonconfidential
information only where the information sought "(i) is highly material and relevant; (ii) is
critical or necessary to the maintenance of a party's claim, defense or proof of an issue
material thereto; and (iii) is not obtainable from any alternative source").
332 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (2009); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237
(2009).
333 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. 10. § 4323 (a) (2009) (providing strong protection for
confidential information but requiring disclosure of nonconfidential information
whenever the "judge determines that the public interest in having the reporter's testimony
outweighs the public interest in keeping [it] confidential").
334 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 2009); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070
(West 2009) (providing absolute protection in civil cases and qualified protection in
criminal cases).
335 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 16. § 61 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (West 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-2 (2009).
336 ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (2009).
337 See Price v. Time, Inc., 416 F.3d 1327, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 2005).
338 See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/8-902 (2009).
339 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-2 (2009).
340 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-46-4-1 (2009).
341 See Ugland & Henderson, supra note 61.
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process rather than evidence of conceptual disagreements.3 42 Whatever the
causes of these imperfections, most shield laws do not fully embody the
features of a principle-based conception of the privilege and can therefore
entrench some of the problems they were enacted to solve.
These problems persist in the more recent shield law debates as well. The
Texas shield law, signed into law in May 2009, uses an expert definition of
journalist,34 3 and legislators in Kansas shot down a shield bill in February
2009 in part over disagreements about whom it should cover. 344 In 2008,
Maine passed a shield law that only protects confidential source
information. 345 Not incidentally, the Maine law is called An Act to Shield
Journalists' Confidential Sources, which clearly puts the emphasis on the
interests of sources rather than the press. The sponsors of a proposed shield
law in Wisconsin have taken this a step further, calling their bill the
Whistleblower Protection Act, even though its provisions are not unlike those
of many other shield laws. In the case of both Maine and Wisconsin, the titles
of the legislation were likely chosen very deliberately to diffuse criticisms
from those who view shield laws as "special interest legislation 346 for the
press. The effect of these strategic choices, however, could be to further
obscure the autonomy arguments that have traditionally undergirded the
privilege and to reinforce the view that the privilege is largely, if not solely,
about the practical public benefits of protecting leakers. And they reflect the
broader problem with shield laws, which is that they typically offer a heavily
circumscribed set of protections under which the rights of the press are preabridged to accommodate opponents, many of whom still cling to the
misapprehension that the privilege exists to exalt journalists as a "special
347
class of citizens."

342 See, e.g., Kelly Shannon, Texas Governor Signs Shield Law to Protect Journos,
EDITOR & PUBLISHER, May 14, 2009, http://www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/
news/article display.jsp?vnu content id=1003973183 (describing the practical hurdles
and negotiations involved in getting the Texas shield law passed).
343 TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 22.021(2) (Vernon 2009) (defining
"Journalist" as someone who gathers and disseminates news "for a substantial portion of
[their] livelihood or for substantial financial gain").
344 See Bill Dalton, KS Shield Law for Journalists Backburnered, KANSAS
Crry.coM, Feb. 18, 2009, http://primebuzz.kcstar.com/?q=node/1 7251.
345 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 61 (2009).
346 Grant Penrod, Buttressing the First Amendment, 29 NEWS MEDIA & LAW 4
(2005) (quoting Professor Jane Kirtley) (characterizing the common arguments of shieldlaw opponents).
347 Dalton, supra note 344.
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and Pathological

The lawyers who represent journalists and media organizations, several
of whom were interviewed for this Article, have observed the judicial shift
away from the principle-based reporter's privilege and have adapted their
approaches accordingly, although not always in ways that help solve the
underlying problem. It is clear they sense some negative movement within
the judiciary. And these changes-whether incremental or tectonic-are
forcing lawyers to make a choice between standing firm on principle or
softening their responses in order to work out the best short-term
arrangement for their clients.
Although federal court rulings on the privilege began to shift in the late
1990s and early 2000s, some lawyers say that the most dramatic changes
have occurred more recently. One lawyer for a national media company said
he has noticed a "significant uptick" in the number of confidential-source
subpoenas in the past five years, especially in federal cases, 348 and
Associated Press General Counsel Dave Tomlin reported a "slight uptick" in
all subpoena activity, but particularly in federal cases. 349 Meanwhile, Eve
Burton, general counsel for the Hearst Corporation, said her organization
350
experienced a "dramatic spike" in subpoena activity in the mid-2000s.
Burton said that in 2004, for example, Hearst received just "a handful" of
subpoenas, but there was a surge in 2005, and that by 2006 and 2007, Hearst
had "a whole docket of them." 35 1 Burton said Hearst received 135 subpoenas
in 2008 and it was on a similar pace for 2009.352
This increase is partly attributable to what Burton calls the "march of
Article I1. 353 During the Bush Administration there were dozens of
proceedings initiated by the executive branch in which journalists were
targeted for information. Burton contends that many members of the Bush
Administration believed in the inherent supremacy of the Executive Branch
and that this political philosophy became a legal strategy. 354 This also spilled

348 This interviewee requested anonymity in order to preserve his client confidences
and to avoid tipping his hand on litigation strategy.
349 Telephone Interview with Dave Tomlin, General Counsel, Associated Press
(June 3, 2009).
350 Burton Interview, supra note 21.
351 Id.

352 Id.
353Id.
354

Id.
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over into the civil context, she said, where private litigants began to believe
355
"they could have whatever they wanted from the press.
Mark Anfinson, who represents the Minnesota Newspaper Association,
said he has not seen an increase in the numbers of subpoenas at the state level
but says state court judges are generally less solicitous of the press' claims
than in the past. 356 Anfinson says the "robust support and defense of the
media that you saw quite broadly on the bench" in earlier periods has
withered, and that the backward "swinging of the pendulum" is apparent not
only in the privilege context but also in libel, access and other cases affecting
journalists. 357 Robert Dreps, who represents the Wisconsin Newspaper
Association, points out that in earlier periods "[Judges] were the ones who
were pushing the envelope. .,in terms of finding [new] protections and
broadening them," but there is now a snowball effect in the opposite
direction. 358 Some courts are re-reading Branzburg and other cases, and
because "judges are emboldened by what they see each other doing," that
negative momentum has started to build. 359 Burton adds that the press has
"always had one branch of government on [its] side and usually two" and
that during the expansion period the reporter's privilege became settled law,
sometimes with the help of all three branches. 3 60 "Now," Burton says, "we
36 1
have zero."
Anfinson said he sees the effects of these shifts in the level of buy-in
from judges about the core rationales underlying the privilege. He says that in
Minnesota, where there is a strong shield law, he used to be able to defeat
subpoenas by simply citing the statute, because judges were already
sympathetic to the philosophical purpose of the statute. "I don't do much of
that anymore," Anfinson says, "because I think it is a likely loser. '362 He
says that lawyers have to make the policy case and push harder to get judges

355 Id.
356 Anfinson Interview, supra note 312.
357 Id.
358 Telephone Interview with Robert Dreps, Lawyer and Counsel to the Wisconsin

Newspaper Association (June 9, 2009).
359 Id. Dreps said this was more the case at the federal level and that he had not
noticed the same changes occurring in Wisconsin where judges have been more solicitous
and where the law is more clearly defined. Id.
360 Burton Interview, supra note 21.
361 Id. This is probably an overstatement. It seems likely that Congress will pass a
federal shield law sometime in the next couple of years, and several states have enacted
shield laws in the past few years. But there is certainly plenty of evidence to justify
Burton's general discouragement.
362 Anfinson Interview, supra note 312.
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to appreciate the broader goals of the privilege and the longer-term
consequences of its denial.
This is always harder in nonconfidential-source cases, where the interests
of sources are not directly implicated. According to New York Times
Company General Counsel George Freeman, "The first instinct of every
judge is the same, which is that if it's a confidential source, they understand
the seriousness of the question. If it's not a confidential source ... at first
instinct they're always terribly unsympathetic. '363 Freeman says that the
shifts occurring in the courts are partly "the result of what works," and that
' 364
the need to protect sources "is an easier argument for judges to grab onto.
This reality ultimately shapes the Times Company's legal strategy.
Freeman said that "[w]e tend to at least go one round even in the
nonconfidential context, but generally speaking if we lose that round, we
won't appeal.., whereas with a confidential source we would appeal and let
it play out."'36 5 The Associated Press ("AP") takes a similar approach. Tomlin
said that in his organization, "[t]he highest value is placed on confidential
information" and the AP will fight those subpoenas aggressively, even to the
point of accepting contempt sanctions. 36 6 With nonconfidential subpoenas,
Tomlin says, AP will "go through the motions every time," but that the
organization's response is limited by "whatever statute or case law or
'367
constitutional law applies.
Several lawyers emphasized that because subpoenas are largely
negotiated outside the courtroom, lawyers' tactical approaches can make all
the difference. Tomlin said, "Even though we regard the protection,
particularly in federal cases, as somewhat threadbare, the practical protection
is in the trouble it takes [the subpoenaing party] to go through those motions
to get the stuff. '36 8 Dreps and Anfinson also noted the importance of the
interactions with the subpoenaing party and that the best defense is in making
clear that they are determined to fight.36 9 As Burton put it, "the law is not as
363 Telephone Interview with George Freeman, General Counsel, N.Y. Times Co.
(June 1, 2009).
364 Id. Freeman says that the same obstacles arise in criminal cases, where judges
are always predisposed to ordering compliance. Id. As Anfinson put it, in criminal cases
"you are often up against the bloody shirt," and that reporters should not be overly
confident that they can resist a criminal subpoena even when judges are compelled-by
statute or the First Amendment-to apply a balancing test. Anfinson Interview, supra
note 312.
365 Freeman Interview, supra note 363.
366 Tomlin Interview, supra note 349.
367 Id.
36 8

Id.
369 Anfinson Interview, supra note 312; Dreps Interview, supra note 358.
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good as our lawyers," and lawyers are more likely to secure a favorable
370
outcome by showing their teeth at the outset.
Unfortunately, too many lawyers are surrendering earlier in that process
because of their perceptions about the state of the law and the fading
receptivity of judges. 37 1 Burton says that a lot of media organizations have
become "gun shy" in this new environment, which is exacerbated by media
consolidation and the weakening economy. Because so many media
companies are part of larger corporate entities with a different set of conflicts
and profit expectations, some organizations are losing their institutional
enthusiasm for mounting costly defenses in subpoena cases. Burton says she
is fortunate to work for a pure media company. "We have the whole company
behind us," she said. "We don't sell dishwashers, and we don't allow the
372
costs of defense, or fear of loss, dictate our strategy."
Lawyers who take a more cautious approach can certainly be forgiven;
their first obligation is to serve their clients' interests, not to act as guardians
of principle. But those two purposes are not irreconcilable in this context. By
complying too willingly, or not exhausting the negotiation process, lawyers
not only encourage future litigants to use journalists as sources of
evidence, 373 they minimize in the public's mind the magnitude of the harm
posed by subpoenas. People are naturally going to assume that journalists are
only opposed to those things that they aggressively resist. So, any
unnecessary or excessive accommodation by journalists-even if part of a
calculated, "pathological" effort to preserve core protections-may
ultimately weaken the privilege in the long term.
These problems are compounded by what is happening in the broader
public debate where the participants routinely portray the privilege in the
narrowest terms and with their attentions focused on instrumental values and
the interests of sources.
D. Conceptual Compression in Public and Scholarly Discourse
It is no coincidence that the transition from the expansion period of the
reporter's privilege to this new pathological period corresponds with the
more general withering of the public's esteem for journalists. According to
the First Amendment Center's annual survey, 40% of the public says the
370 Burton Interview, supranote 21.
371 See Jones, supra note 18, at 661 (noting that media organizations complied fully
with 60.1% of the subpoenas they received in 2001).
372 Burton interview, supranote 21.
373 Burton said that in her experience "the more you respond [to subpoenas] the
more you get." Id.
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press has "too much freedom" while only 10% says it has "too little," 374 and
the overall trajectory of public support for and confidence in the press has
declined steadily since the mid-I 970s. 375 Journalists have always struggled to
convince the public that their ability to uncover the truth requires a set of
protections that are not afforded to the public generally, but the problem is
acute today with the deterioration of ethical standards in the mainstream
media, the proliferation of journalistic charlatans who taint the image of
more credible practitioners, and other changes that are inspiring doubts about
376
the strength and sincerity of the press' commitment to the public interest.
Of course, the claim that the reporter's privilege is a special right is
largely a mischaracterization. That critique is only apt where the protection is
tied to an expert definition of the press that assigns the privilege to certain
types of journalists who have an approved set of credentials or institutional
affiliations. The privilege is better understood, however, as a protection that
applies to anyone who serves a journalistic function. Unfortunately, there are
still some shield laws-including the House version of the FFIA-that use
expert definitions, which not only fly in the face of a principle-based
conception of the privilege, but they enable those who seek to portray the
privilege as a manifestation of press exceptionalism.
Some of the more recent legal scholarship has reinforced this expert
view. Lawrence Alexander, for example, proposed that the privilege be
extended only to those who gather and disseminate "news," 377 Kara Larsen
suggested excluding bloggers and other nontraditional journalists who are not
"regularly engaged in newsgathering," 3 78 and Scott Neinas proposed that the
privilege be reserved for "working journalists. '379 These proposals are not as
broad as they ought to be under a principle-based, fundamental-rights view
of the privilege; nevertheless, they represent relatively minor delimitations
compared to some of the other recent scholarship that either rejects the

374

FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, STATE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (2006),

http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/about.aspx?item=state-first-amendment-2006.

375 See Michael Shudson & Danielle Haas, Who Hates the Press?, COLUM.

JOURNALISM REV. 70, 70 (Nov.-Dec. 2007).
376

See generally Robert W. McChesney, COMMUNICATION REVOLUTION: CRITICAL

JUNCTURES AND THE FUTURE OF MEDIA (2007).

377 Alexander, supra note 29, at 99.

378 Larsen, supra note 70, at 1268.
379 Scott Neinas, Comment, A Skinny Shield Is Better: Why Congress Should
Propose a FederalReporters' Shield Statute That Narrowly Defines Journalists,40 U.
TOLEDO L. REv. 225 (2008). Similar proposals have been made in previous periods. See,
e.g., David Joseph Onorato, Note, A Press Privilegefor the Worst of Times, 75 GEO. L.J.
361, 362 (1986) (endorsing shield protection for the institutional press).
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legitimacy of the privilege altogether 380 or that endorses a substantially
381
truncated version of it.
The changing tenor of the public debate is even more remarkable and
perhaps more consequential than the ones occurring among scholars and
judges. Because the battle over the privilege is now being fought in Congress
and the state legislatures, the framing of the debate and the conceptions of
the privilege advanced by policymakers, journalists and others are critical.
Yet in those debates the privilege is almost always portrayed in narrow terms
and is supported by policy-based rationales. Reps. Mike Pence and Rick
Boucher, co-sponsors of the House version of FFIA, have defended their
proposed legislation in newspaper commentaries and public comments by
emphasizing the public's interests rather than those of reporters. This appears
to be a deliberate strategy to beat back the special-rights critiques. Pence told
members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors to "[c]onvey to
[their] legions of readers around the country that this is not about protecting
reporters, it is about protecting the people's right to know." 38 2 In a
commentary in the Richmond Times Dispatch, Boucher wrote that protecting
sources would advance "the public's right to know" and provide "a stronger
underpinning of both freedom of the press and free speech in future
years." 383 The emphasis on the free flow of information is certainly
warranted; it is a value that undergirds nearly everyone's conception of the
privilege. But the only harms about which Boucher expresses concern are
those tied directly to the absence of source protection. 3 84 And by
emphasizing the free speech rights of sources, he leaves the impression that
the shield is as much about protecting whistleblowers as it is about press
independence.
380

See, e.g., Eliason, supra note 29, at 385-87; John D. Castiglione, A Structuralist

Critique of the Journalist'sPrivilege,23 J. L. & POL. 115, 129-30 (2007) (arguing that a
reporter's privilege functions more as a privilege for government leakers, which in turn
upsets the "constitutional order" by creating power imbalances among the branches of
government).
381 See, e.g., Larsen, supra note 70, at 1268 (supporting shield law, but only for
confidential sources); Clark, supra note 29, at 369 (rejecting extension of the privilege

for nonconfidential information).

382 Tom Scarritt, Editorial, Protecting Your Right to Know, BIRMINGHAM NEWS,
Apr. 1, 2007, at C1. Other members of Congress, including Sen. Arlen Specter, have used
the same approach. See Arlen Specter, Op-Ed., Why We Need a Shield Law, WASH. POST,
May 5, 2008, at A17 ("But a media shield law would not primarily be protection for
journalists; it would be protection for the public and for our form of government.").
383 Rick Boucher, Op-Ed., Freedom of Press:Federal Sources Legislation Protects
Public'sRight to Know, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 12, 2006, at El.
384 Boucher expressed concern about the "chilling effect" of subpoenas, but only as
it related to the willingness of sources to come forward. Id.
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Boucher and Pence's arguments mirror the rhetorical approaches used by
many other advocates for the privilege, including the authors of most of the
hundreds of pro-privilege newspaper editorials and columns published in the
past several years. 385 Those proposals typically present the privilege as solely
a protection for confidential information; 386 they emphasize the rights of the
sources, 387 and they point to the immediate public benefits that would result
from shielding whistleblowers, 388 all while ignoring the broader autonomy
and fundamental-rights arguments 389 and the egalitarian conception of the

385 From January 2005 through August 2008, daily newspapers in the U.S.
published more than 300 editorials, and scores more columns and Op-Ed. pieces,
addressing various aspects of the privilege, with the vast majority focused on the merits
of state or federal shield legislation. The author of this Article used Lexis-Nexis to access
and review those publications. This was not a systematic study but a more informal effort
to identify the ways in which newspaper editorial writers were framing the issue and the
lines of argument they employed.
386 All of the hundreds of editorials examined by the author presented the privilege
as being primarily or exclusively about protecting confidential-source information. See,
e.g., Editorial, A Needed Shield, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2007, at A24 ("The Senate
Judiciary Committee will mark up a bill today that would protect the relationship
between journalists and their confidential sources at the federal level."); Editorial,
Defending Press Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2007, at A20 ("[T]he House voted 398
to 21 for a much-needed measure that would help protect reporters from being forced to
reveal confidential sources in federal court."); Editorial, Sunshine Award, RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 18, 2008, at Al 2 ("The legislation would shield journalists from
being compelled to identify their sources .... ").
387 Much like Rep. Boucher, the editorial writers and columnists have shifted the
attention away from the reporters and toward the sources, or the public. See, e.g.,
Editorial, Shield Guards the Nation, BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 15, 2007, at A10 ("[l]f we, the
people of the United States, want to know what our government is doing, in our name and
with our money, we cannot always count on our government to tell us."); Editorial,
Shield Law Must Advance, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 3, 2007, at B8 ("The shield measures would
bring federal law into line with the overwhelming majority of states that recognize
confidential sources are essential to reporting the news-and protecting the public's right
to know.").
388 See, e.g., Editorial, Protect Reporters, Citizens, PALM BEACH POST, May 14,
2008, at 8A ("What citizens don't know can hurt them, and citizens who know of
wrongdoing deserve support in coming forward.").
389 These arguments were not entirely absent, although they were uncommon and
often appeared in the form of general references to press independence. See, e.g.,
Editorial, Shield the Press, PRESS-ENTERPRISE, July 7, 2005, at B8 ("If the media are to
function as independent watchdogs of government, then media sources cannot be subject
to government reprisals for speaking out.").
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press. 390 Indeed, some of those authors and advocates even concede to their
'39 1
opponents that the privilege is a "special protection.
The opponents of the privilege, despite being wildly outnumbered in the
editorial space, have unleashed a full arsenal of arguments with the apparent
goal of not only knocking down the shield-law bills, but of obliterating the
entire concept of a journalist's privilege. 392 The advocates for the privilege,
by comparison, are using a smaller pallet of arguments that are drawn from a
narrow conception of the privilege and that are loaded up with qualifiers
designed to appease their critics: "The First Amendment was not written for
us; it was written for you;" 393 the shield law's primary purpose is not to
create "some special perk just to protect journalists.., it truly
protects ... [the public's] right to know." 394 The shield bills "do not provide,

390 Most editorials do not address the definition of a journalist directly, except
occasionally to acknowledge the definitional difficulty and to suggest that it is not
insurmountable. See, e.g., Editorial, Only a Shield Law Can Thaw the Chill, BOSTON
HERALD, July 12, 2005, at 24 (noting that a proposed shield law in Massachusetts would
likely encompass many bloggers, but adding that "during the last presidential election,
many bloggers earned the right to be considered serious gatherers and disseminators of
news.").
391 See The Kathleen Dunn Show (Wisconsin Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 13,
2008) (airing comment from Lucy Dalglish, Executive Director of the Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press: "I agree that what journalists are asking for is
special. Journalists need to realize this and to be humble about it."); Penrod, supra note
346, at 6 (quoting American Association of Newspaper Editors lawyer Kevin Goldberg,
"In a way it may be special protection for journalists, but it may be one whose time has
come"); Scarritt, supra note 382 ("Many of us in the press get a bit uncomfortable when
we start discussing special treatment for ourselves").
392 See, e.g., Michael Battle, Op-Ed., No Special Privilege, USA TODAY, June 22,
2006, at 12A (suggesting that a shield law is "dangerous" and would imperil national
security); Bruce Fein, Op-Ed., Privilege Obstructs Justice, USA TODAY, May 14, 2007,
at 1OA ("A federal newsman's privilege would enable journalists to conceal confidential
communications relevant to proving criminal or civil wrongdoing. In other words, it
would obstruct justice."); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Op-Ed., No 'Freedom to Keep
Secrets,' USA TODAY, Mar. 10, 2008, at 1OA ("The Constitution merely protects the
freedom of speech and publication-not the freedom to keep secrets, which is what
journalists are asking for when they seek special privileges of non-disclosure."); Eugene
Volokh, Op-Ed., You Can Blog, but You Can't Hide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at A39
(asserting the impossibility of defining "journalist").
393 Scarritt, supranote 382.
394 Dale Davenport, Op-Ed., Watchdog Role: Shield Laws Aren't Just for
Journalists,They ProtectEveryone, PATRIOT NEWS, May 27, 2007, at F4.
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nor does the media seek, [an] absolute privilege; '3 95 "[t]he journalist is
merely the conduit;" 396 and so on.
There is an almost apologetic tone that runs through many of these
editorial arguments, and a "pathological" resignation to the idea that the
privilege, in its ideal form, is now wholly out of reach. As a result, many
proponents urge their colleagues to be pragmatic in the face of all the
obstacles, to "take what [they] can get, '397 to recognize that "a limited
privilege.., is better than none," 398 and not to risk it all "by being
absolutist. ' 399 Journalists' caution is understandable. They do not want to
appear strident when seeking to change the status quo (at least in the context
of shield laws), particularly when that change depends on the magnanimity
of policymakers and the public. But these rhetorical tactics, if that is all they
are, 40 0 could have some unintended consequences.
By building the privilege around policy arguments and the value of
anonymous disclosures, journalists begin to lose control of the privilege by
vesting it with their sources and encouraging the view that the protection
belongs to (and may therefore be waived by) the source. In addition, the
emphasis on sources implies that confidentiality is the sine qua non of the
privilege, and that journalists' resistance to nonconfidential subpoenas is just
a gratuitous self-indulgence. Finally, by emphasizing the public-interest
benefits of confidential-source disclosures while ignoring the broader
autonomy arguments, proponents of the privilege make themselves
vulnerable to those who would apply short-term public-interest criteria to
assess the harm that specific subpoenas pose to journalists, 40 1 those who
would demand empirical evidence that subpoenas inhibit sources from

395

A6.

Editorial, Shield Law Helps Us Protect You,

BUFFALO

NEWS, July 25, 2005, at

396 Doug Clifton, Editorial, Sources and Journalists Must Be Protected by Law,
2005, at B9.

CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 10,
397 Westphal, supra note 20.

398 Jack Nelson, Op-Ed., A Limited Shield Law for Reporters Is Better Than None,
SALT LAKE TRmUNE, June 30, 2006.
399 Westphal, supra note 20.
400 A more troublesome possibility is that many of these contributors have already
internalized a narrower view of the privilege and that these rhetorical approaches are not
merely tactical choices, but honest reflections of the contributors' conceptions of the
privilege.
401 See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
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coming forward, 402 and those who view the privilege as little more than an
40 3
indemnity for leakers and turncoats.
On a more fundamental level, all of this rhetorical framing provides an
unsteady foundation for the privilege, making it less resistant to the
inevitable attempts in the future to taper or eliminate it. Judges could also be
influenced by the scope and tenor of the public discussion. It would be ideal
if judges were inattentive to these extra-judicial debates, but there is no doubt
that judges are cognizant of public opinion, and as media consumers
themselves, they have their own ideas about what the press needs or, indeed,
deserves.
V. CONCLUSION

The early twenty-first century has the potential to be a renaissance period
for American journalism with the emergence of new storytelling tools and
the disappearance of many of the old entry barriers. Unfortunately, the
liberation of the craft of journalism is occurring contemporaneously with a
contraction of the law of journalism. This is especially evident in the
reporter's privilege context where judges are narrowing the scope of
longstanding protections and softening their applications of established
criteria. The great period of reporter's privilege expansion that began after
Branzburg has ended, and journalists have reason to worry about a
continuing backslide, despite efforts by Congress and some state legislatures
to mitigate these harms through statute.
Too many journalists have responded to the judicial retreat by favoring a
truncated conception of the privilege that focuses on the interests of sources
and that emphasizes the instrumental value of confidentiality. In their
responses to particular court rulings, and in their efforts to secure shield-law
protection, some have portrayed the privilege-whether subconsciously or as
an intentionally "pathological" response to mounting opposition-as little
more than whistleblower protection. In the process, they have weakened,
through neglect, some of the key theoretical pillars that support the larger
concept of a reporter's privilege.
As for journalists' lawyers, most have steadfastly sought to secure and
preserve the broadest possible protections for their clients. But many of them,
too, are conceding points that they might have contested in the past, and too
402 See Eliason, supra note 29, at 417-18.
403 See Castiglione, supra note 380, at 119; Matthew Pollack, Pence and Mukasey
Square off on Shield Bill, THE REPORTERS COMMrTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, July
23, 2008, http://www.rcfp.org/newsitems/index.php?i=6881 (quoting Former Attorney
General Michael Mukasey: "What I'm not willing to do is to take steps that will
essentially do more to protect leakers than it does to protect journalists.").
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many of them are-as Burton points out4°4 and as the data from Jones' study
reveal 4 5-complying with subpoenas with little resistance. To the extent that
these lawyers are merely being pragmatic, their responses are defensible.
They have to serve their clients first, take the law as it is, and avoid the risk,
as Freeman said, "of making the law in general worse" 4 06 by inviting rulings
from skeptical judges. But these capitulations, combined with journalists'
increasingly accommodationist rhetoric, invite judges, litigants and
policymakers to minimize the actual harms posed by subpoenas and to
reinforce the view that the privilege is just a generous public policy rather
than a resolute principle. Journalists, media lawyers and pro-privilege
legislators would do better in the long run if they started speaking about the
reporter's privilege as a right, writing about it as a right, and litigating it as a
right.
The more significant change, however, needs to come from the judiciary.
Courts need to reorient their reporter's privilege doctrine, starting from the
premise that it is a constitutional right, or, alternatively, that it is the
manifestation of a principle that transcends the normal policy concerns and
that warrants recognition under the common law. They need to acknowledge
that the right to gather news is an individual right, claimable by anyone who
serves the purposes for which the protection exists, and that while there is an
important social-structural purpose that underlies the privilege, recognition of
the protection should not depend on the demonstration of discrete public
benefits in every instance. If judges conceived of the privilege as a right and
as a matter of principle, they would have no choice but to embrace an
egalitarian definition of the press and to abandon any partitioning of the
privilege in which its protections are available in some contexts and wholly
invisible in others. Finally, they would have to embrace tests that provide a
more formidable obstacle for subpoenaing parties and to demand that in
applying those criteria, judges remain cognizant of the subtle, incremental
and even symbolic harm that excessive subpoenas can cause.

404 See supra notes 360-61 and accompanying text.
405 See Jones, supra note 18, at 661.
406 Freeman Interview, supra note 363.

